The
University
of Chicago
Law Review
_LawReview

I

.VOLUME
48 NUMBER

3 SUMMER 1981

a 1981 by The University of Chicago

State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality
JonathanD. Varatt
From the nation's inception, explicit constitutional provisions
have limited state power to discriminate against the inhabitants of
other states." In order "to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different states in this
union," the Articles of Confederation declared the principle that
each state generally must treat the residents of sister states as it
would treat its own.2 When the Constitution was first adopted, it
t Acting Professor of Law, University of California (Los Angeles). I am grateful to my
colleagues Theodore Eisenberg, Kenneth L. Karst, William A. Klein, Gerald P. Lopez,
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Gary T. Schwartz, Murray L. Schwartz, and Steven Shiffrin for generous readings and constructive criticisms of prior versions of this article.
In 1776, even before the American colonies became states, a committee of the Continental Congress, appointed to propose articles of confederation, drafted two articles protecting the inhabitants of one colony from discrimination by another. See Antieau, Paul'sPerverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Four, 9 Wm. & MARY L. Rzv. 1, 2-5 (1967). English law protective of "alien friends" is
traced to the Magna Carta in R. HowELL, THE PRIVMEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE CmZENSHIP 9-13 (1918). Howell further claimed that, by the time of the Articles of Confederation, "independently of any constitutional provision, the citizens of the thirteen original
states were entitled to the enjoyment of a considerable class of privileges upon removal from
their own to another State." Id. at 13. In his view, the constitutional provisions were drafted
to extend the scope of these protections and render them more secure. Id.
2 Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states,
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state
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embodied this principle in two separate provisions. The article I
grant to Congress of the power to regulate interstate commerce s
implicitly curtailed state power to affect that commerce;4 one of
the core limits imposed was a ban on state discrimination against
commercial relationships between one state's residents and another's.5 Article IV, the states' relations article, spoke more dishall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and
restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restriction shall
not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state, to any
other state, of which the Owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition,
duties, or restriction shall be laid by any state, on the property of the united states, or
either of them.
19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 214-15 (G. Hunt ed. 1912).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
4 The Supreme Court established early that, without waiting for Congress to act, the
judiciary should enforce the commerce clause as a constitutional limit on state power to
interfere with interstate commerce. The judicial enforcement role rests on logical, historical,
and practical assumptions. Logically, the delegation of the commerce power to Congress
deprived the states of constitutional power to regulate commerce. See, e.g., Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197-200, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (dictum). With the prominent exception of Chief Justice Taney, who "flatly denied that the mere grant of the commerce power operated to limit state power," F. FRANKFURTER, THn COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TNY AND WATE 50 (1937), the focus of debate was not whether the
states were constitutionally limited, but how much. After Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), settled that the commerce clause ousts state power if the subject
of regulation is national in nature, but not if the subject is local, "there was distinctly a job
for the courts to do." Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 5
(1940).
Historically, a prime reason for calling the Constitutional Convention was to deal with
widespread commercial warfare among the states. Justice Johnson, concurring in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 226 (1824), asserted that as a result of the Convention's adoption of a centralized power to regulate commerce, "[b]y common consent," and without any
need for congressional action or state repeal, state regulations of interstate commerce antedating the Constitution, "dropped lifeless from their statute books, for want of the sustaining power, that had been relinquished to Congress." See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949).
Finally, judicial enforcement of the "dormant" or "unexercised" commerce clause is justified by the superior ability of courts, as compared with Congress, to evaluate state commercial regulations in operation and by the realization that Congress's inability to review
(for lack of time and inclination, given other priorities) every state regulation affecting interstate commerce would, if the courts did not intervene, place "the inertia of government
. .heavily on the side of the centrifugal forces of localism." Brown, The Open Economy:
Justice Frankfurterand the Position of the Judiciary,67 YALE L.J. 219, 222 (1957) (footnote omitted).
5 When applying the commerce clause, the Supreme Court will strike down a state law
adversely affecting interstate commerce unless it satisfies two requirements. First, in order
to ensure free trade among the states, state laws may not discriminate against interstate
trade unless "nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake" are unavailable. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
353 (1977). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
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rectly. It explicitly prohibited state discrimination against the citizens of other states by providing that "[t]he Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."'
The language of "citizenship" in the privileges and immunities
clause has at times obscured the common concern of that clause
and the antidiscrimination portion of the commerce clause with
the problem of state discrimination against individuals or businesses domiciled in one of the other states. Although nonresidents
have always been able to invoke the commerce clause to attack
state discrimination in favor of resident interests,7 classifications
on the basis of state of "residence" have sometimes escaped examination under the privileges and immunities clause on the theory
that only classifications on the basis of state of "citizenship" were
covered. 8 The distinction never had any real substance, 9 particu-

Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). This amounts to a virtually per se rule of invalidity for state
laws favoring local commercial interests over out-of-state businesses. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318, 336 (1977). In the latter case, Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, said:
The prohibition against discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause. Permitting the individual States to enact
laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses "would invite
a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive" of the free trade which the
Clause protects.
Id. at 329 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
Second, even nondiscriminatory state laws must not unduly burden commerce. The
Court's general approach to the "burden" criterion is set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted):
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
For a comprehensive analysis disapproving judicial enforcement of the burden standard, but
approving and refining judicial enforcement of the antidiscrimination criterion, see Tushnet,
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rav. 125.
6

U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2, cL 1.

IE.g., cases cited notes 14-15 infra. The commerce clause embraces all interstate trade
relationships without regard to the nature of the persons or entities involved at either end of
the interstate transaction. As the Court said in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183
(1869): "The language of the [commerce clause] makes no reference to the instrumentalities
by which commerce may be carried on; it is general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations."
" E.g., Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Maxwell v. Bugbee,
250 U.S. 525 (1919); La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
1 As Brainerd Currie cogently argued when urging the "fiat rejection" of the "idea that
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larly after the fourteenth amendment made citizens of the United
States also citizens "of the State wherein they reside." 10 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has found citizenship and residence classifications "'essentially interchangeable'

. . .

for purposes of anal-

ysis of most cases under the Privileges and Immunities Clause."11
Joint treatment of these two clauses is appropriate, therefore, because each imposes limits on state authority to discriminate on the
basis of state residence.
In addition to having been a part of the Constitution since its
adoption, each clause has a separate history of judicial enforcement of the principle barring discrimination on the basis of state
residence. 2 Even accounting for the occasional divergence of the
concepts of residence and citizenship, 8 therefore, it is surprising
that we are still at the threshold of understanding when a state
should be able to provide its own residents with advantages denied
to nonresidents. The principle, like most principles of constitutional law, is not absolute. It cannot be, for fulfillment of the fundamental obligation of state government-to care for the state's
own residents--depends, to some ill-defined degree, on the ability
to withhold from others what a state chooses to provide to its own.
As a result, there is a need to accommodate the interstate equality
principle and the demands of local obligation in a way that respects the legitimate claims of each. Though the problem is simply
the clause does not reach discrimination couched in terms of residence," Currie & Schreter,
UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69
YALE L.J. 1323, 1347 (1960), reprinted in B. CuRRmE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 445, 473 (1963): "In the typical state the overwhelming majority of residents are also

citizens... and so the general tendency and effect [of a discriminatory statute is] to accomplish a discrimination in favor of local citizens and against citizens of other states." Id.
at 1344, reprinted in B. CuRRE, supra, at 469. See generally id. at 1343-49, reprintedin B.
CuRm,supra, at 468-75.

20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cL 1 provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." As a result, discrimination against those who reside in
other states is virtually identical with discrimination against citizens of other states whenever the state's concept of "residence" coincides with that of the fourteenth amendment.
" Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975)).
" "Residence" in this sense is equivalent to "domicile"--the one state with which an

individual or business is most closely connected. See generally Reese & Green, That Elusive
Word, "Residence," 6 VmD. L. Rhv. 561 (1953).
,3 Some "residence" distinctions were struck down after plenary review under article IV
even during the very period that other distinctions on the basis of residence were held immune from review. E.g., Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
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stated, developing criteria to separate allowable from forbidden
distinctions between residents and nonresidents is a formidable
task.
The prime area of uncertainty is the distribution of the public
resources, opportunities, and benefits available within each state.
The states generally are prohibited from giving their own residents
preferential access to the benefits of the state's private sector.
Thus, under the commerce clause, the states may not impose restrictions granting in-state consumers either the exclusive right, or
even priority, to purchase commodities produced or obtained
within the state's private sector.1 Nor may the states reserve the
purchasing power of resident private consumers for the advantage
of resident business by denying nonresident business an equal
chance to compete for the resident consumers' dollars.1 5 Similarly,
the privileges and immunities clause guarantees an inhabitant of
one state a right to the same access to private sector employment
in any other state as that state's inhabitants possess, whether the
employment is in an interstate or a purely local business.1 Furthermore, that clause guarantees against state infringement the
right of the inhabitants of one state, when in another, to hold
property17 and, presumably, to purchase from local private enterprise on equal terms with local residents.1
14 E.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Pennsylvania v. West

Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
,5 E.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co.
v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
16 E.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415
(1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418
(1871).
17 E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). The seminal case of Corfield v. Coryell,
6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), included the right "to take, hold, and
dispose of property" among those "fundamental" rights protected by the privileges and immunities clause, and the Court has continued to make that assumption ever since. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). See generally
Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States (pt. 2), 1 MICH. L.
Rv. 364, 367-73 (1903). The place of the "fundamental" rights notion in privileges and
immunities doctrine is discussed in text at notes 88-118 infra.
18 Although a majority of the Court recently upheld a residence-discriminatory license
fee to hunt elk for sport in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), Chief
Justice Burger went out of his way to emphasize in a concurring opinion that the
Court does not hold that the Clause permits a State to give its residents preferred
access to recreational activities offered for sale by private parties ....
The Clause assures noncitizens the opportunity to purchase goods and services on the same basis as
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When the distribution of public sector resources is at issue,
however, several difficult questions remain unsettled. Some, but
not all, public benefits can be reserved for the exclusive or preferential use of the state's inhabitants. The task of separating which
can and cannot be reserved poses impressive obstacles. The complexity of the problem can best be revealed by a series of illustrative questions: If a state may exclude nonresidents from elementary and secondary public schools, may it also exclude them from
public institutions of higher education or public hospitals? Even if
it may not deny access entirely, may a state charge a nonresident
more for these services than it charges residents? May a state exclude nonresidents entirely from, or charge them more for, the use
of the state's courts, public parklands, public highways, or public
transportation systems? If not, why are nonresidents not entitled
to equal, or even any, access to welfare payments or public housing? Is denial of nonresident eligibility for state employment more
troublesome than denial of eligibility for welfare benefits? If a
state-run business may, consistently with the commerce clause,
prefer in-state customers when it sells products manufactured
from raw materials, 9 does it follow that a state may prefer resident customers if the state owns and distributes valuable natural
resources such as oil and gas? Finally, why is the Court equally
clear that state tax and regulatory schemes violate the commerce
clause if they deprive out-of-state businesses of competitive advantages they may possess over in-state competitors, and that state
subsidy programs that extend eligibility to in-state businesses only,
and may thereby reduce out-of-state competitive advantages to the
same degree, are totally consistent with the commerce clause? 0
The Supreme Court has never settled on a general theory of
state citizenship that would serve to separate those publicly provided benefits belonging peculiarly to state residents and those to
which nonresidents must be accorded equal access. The Court has,
on rare occasion, spoken of the existence of "general" and "special" claims of state citizenship 1 to signify where state obligations
of equal treatment for nonresidents do and do not extend, but it

citizens; it confers the same protection upon the buyer of luxury goods and services as
upon the buyer of bread.
Id. at 394.
" The Supreme Court recently held that it could. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429

(1980).
20
21

See text at notes 194-206 infra.
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1877), discussed in text at notes 26-31 infra.
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has not developed any general theory that would give content to
those distinctions. Instead, it has developed some partial doctrines
governing the accommodation of interstate equality and local obligation in a limited range of contexts.
This article attempts to develop the substantive principles
that should define the proper scope of state authority to favor
state residents in the distribution of public resources. The article
first traces the relevant Supreme Court doctrines and demonstrates their inadequacies. Part I examines the persistent hold of
the distinction between the state as regulator and the state as proprietor, in both privileges and immunities doctrine and commerce
clause doctrine, as well as the current privileges and immunities
doctrine that rests application of the clause on whether or not the
privilege or immunity claimed is fundamental. Finding these doctrines inadequate to cope with the complexity of the problem, Part
II offers an alternative approach that takes full account of both the
Constitution's recognition of the states as separate, semiautonomous political communities, and the interstate equality objectives
of the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses. The contemplated purposes and powers of state government and the aims
of interstate equality are sometimes inconsistent. Part II therefore
explores the reasons behind the general principle against residence
discrimination, develops a theory of state "citizenship" to demonstrate when a state's favoritism towards its own residents is presumptively justified despite that principle, and suggests and evaluates some special factors that appear to call for adherence to the
norm of interstate equality even in cases where there otherwise
would be a prima facie justification for preference of state residents. With that theoretical framework in mind, Parts III and IV
examine in some detail the constitutionality of state resident preference policies as applied to the distribution of a wide range of
public resources. Finally, Part V addresses the role of Congress
and asks, on the one hand, how far Congress can go in depriving
the states of power to confer exclusive benefits or preferences on
their residents, and, on the other, how far it can go in authorizing
state discrimination against nonresidents where the states alone
would not have that power.
The agenda is long, and the difficulties of the subject should
not be underestimated. Every issue of state resident preference, especially in the public sector, is simultaneously an issue of discrimination and an issue of federalism. All of the subtleties of equal
protection doctrine are present. The invidiousness of the classify-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:487

ing trait, the nature of the interests affected by the classification,
and the justifications offered to support the use of the classification-all are necessarily in question here. 2 In addition, assessment
of those criteria in the context of residence classifications requires
consideration of the role of state government within the federal
union, the nature of the relationships between the states and their
residents and between the states and nonresidents, and the importance of good relations among the states. Constitutional issues of
interstate equality thus reflect a number of the most difficult features of constitutional law. Any effort to develop appropriate principles to govern this relatively neglected area of the law should attempt to give each feature its due and should, therefore, be
sensitive both to the character of state "citizenship" and to the
imperatives of interstate equality. That is the basic premise of the
effort that follows.
I.

A.

SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE: AN ANALYsIs AND CRITIQUE

The Significance of State Ownership

The concepts of property and autonomy are fundamentally
linked in our constitutional order. Rights in property signify a
range of choice in the owner's use of that property, including
choices about whom to admit and whom to exclude in its distribution or use. Because of the hold of these traditional assumptions,
there is an understandable temptation to treat government ownership as though it should be accompanied by a freedom of choice
with respect to the property owned similar to that accompanying
private ownership. As a consequence, our law, including our constitutional law, is filled with doctrines that distinguish exertions of
government power through compulsory regulation or taxation from
governmental exercises of power through "proprietary choice. ' '23
This is not to say that the Supreme Court has always allowed
government the same degree of freedom in proprietary choice as it
has allowed individuals. Nor do I mean to imply that the Court has
2'In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), for example, Justice Marshall said

for the Court "To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection clause, we look, in
essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the
classification."
23For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrinal uses of the distinction, see Wells &
Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L.
REv. 1073 (1980).
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uncritically accepted analogies designed to reserve for government
the same degree of autonomy that is recognized for private proprietors. For example, the immunity private proprietors would possess, absent civil rights legislation, to discriminate in their business
dealings on racial or other invidious grounds would certainly not
extend to government.2 Furthermore, the Court sometimes questions whether a form of government conduct claimed to be proprietary can fairly be characterized as such.2 5 But for all of this, it is
nonetheless true that the proprietary concept has had a recurring,
if erratic, influence on the Court's willingness to sanction government actions it might otherwise condemn. Nowhere is this more
true than in the history of Supreme Court decisions under the
commerce clause and the interstate privileges and immunities
clause.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the use of the proprietary/regulatory distinction in those settings. In the course of
that evaluation, it will become clear that the grasp of the proprietary idea has been tenacious but uncertain. In light of the Court's
ambivalence toward proprietary power, a number of questions
arise. Is the distinction grounded in a meaningful set of constitutional values? Do the usual sources of constitutional interpretation
compel or even suggest its use? To what degree does it clarify or
obscure analysis? Finally, should the distinction be modified or
abandoned?
1. The ProprietaryIdea and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Three decisions of the Supreme Court involving nonresident access to natural resources illustrate the uncertain place of
the proprietary idea in privileges and immunities doctrine. In McCready v. Virginia,2 6 the post-Civil War Supreme Court upheld
state power to forbid nonresidents from planting oysters in state24 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). Compare Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (dictum) (no violation of the fourteenth amendment for private owners
to adhere voluntarily to an agreement to refuse to sell to blacks) with Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961) (even though refusal of a purely private restaurant to serve blacks would not violate fourteenth amendment, refusal of service by a privately owned restaurant leasing a portion of a state-owned building otherwise devoted to

public business would).
" E.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528-31 (1978). Compare Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1975) (Blackmun, J.) (state ownership of theater
does not change its nature as a public forum and hence does not justify censorship) with id.
at 570-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state can control use of its theater in nondiscriminatory fashion).
24

94 U.S. 391 (1877).
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owned tidelands. Chief Justice Waite said that the valuable right
to share in the use of Virginia's tidebeds was "in fact, a property
right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship, '

'7

so

that the citizens of Virginia, "and they alone, owned the property
to be sold or used, and they alone had the power to dispose of it as
they saw fit."2 The Court did not doubt that Virginia was constitutionally restricted in imposing more burdensome conditions on
the pursuit of a livelihood in Virginia by citizens of other states
than on similar activities by its own citizens. Rather, it assumed
that a state, like any other owner, could grant to whomever it
chose "the exclusive use of a part of the common property."29 Just
as a private owner in Virginia might choose not to deal with nonresidents, so could the state reserve its property for its own citizens
without impairing a privilege or immunity of "general" as opposed
to "special" citizenship. 80 Thus the Court likened the reservation
of Virginia tideland for the use of Virginia citizens to the distribution to residents only of the proceeds of sales of state land and to
the assumed right of the state as landlord to restrict the rental of
state land for planting corn to residents alone. 31
Just after World War H, a very different Supreme Court took
a very different view of a claim of state proprietary power to exclude nonresidents. Toomer v. Witsell,3 2 the high-water mark of
the doctrine of interstate equality in the Supreme Court, held invalid, under the privileges and immunities clause, South Carolina's
attempt to charge nonresidents 100 times more than residents for a
license to pursue migratory shrimp found in the state's coastal waters3 8 The Court rejected the argument that South Carolina had a
property interest in the shrimp that justified the discrimination.
Although Chief Justice Vinson characterized McCready in unflattering terms,34 he ultimately distinguished the two cases on the
27

Id. at 395.

" Id. at 396.
29 Id.
SO Id.
31 Id. at 395-96.
32 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
3 Although the degree of discrimination against nonresidents in Toomer was dramatically severe, it stopped short of the total exclusion allowed in McCready. Id. at 389.
3 He described McCready as the only case where the "Court actually upheld State
action discriminating against commercial fishing or hunting by citizens of other States
where there were advanced no persuasive independent reasons justifying the discrimination," id. at 400; he said that "[h]owever satisfactorily the ownership theory explains ...
McCready," it was distinguishable, id. at 401; and he concluded that "the McCready excep-
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ground that South Carolina's interest in shrimp was much less of
an "ownership" interest than Virginia's interest in its tidelands. As
free-swimming creatures that migrate along the Atlantic seaboard,
shrimp that have not been reduced to possession could not easily
be said to belong to South Carolina just because they were sometimes known to be in the ocean bordering that state.3 5 Moreover,
the Court had earlier held in United States v.Californias3 that
"neither the thirteen original colonies nor their successor States
separately acquired 'ownership' of the three-mile belt.

37

Having

concluded that South Carolina did not own either the shrimp or
the sea in which they could be found, Chief Justice Vinson then
took a (perhaps unnecessary) step further and maintained that the
"whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but
a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource. "38
Toomer's begrudging treatment of McCready left the continuing vitality of the proprietary "exception" to the privileges and immunities clause uncertain. So does the current Court's unanimous
decision in Hicklin v. Orbeck,39 which rejected the claim of Alaska
that, as owner of substantial oil and gas deposits within the state,
it could require private employers extracting or piping oil and gas
under arrangements with the state, as well as businesses providing
support services, to hire Alaska residents in preference to nonresidents for in-state work. The Court squarely refused to "agree that
the fact that a State owns a resource, of itself, completely removes
a law concerning that resource from the prohibitions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'

0

Instead, state ownership "is a fac-

tor-although often the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against noncitizens
violates the Clause."' 1 In Hicklin, the factor of ownership was not
dispositive, because
tion to the privileges and immunities clause, if such it be, should not be expanded to cover
this case," id. at 402.
" Id. at 401.
332 U.S 19 (1947).

36

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
Id. Toomer did recognize that some discriminatory conduct would not be barred by
the privileges and immunities clause. For the test it developed, see note 94 infra.
a' 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
40Id. at 528.
41 Id. at 529.
37
3
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Alaska has little or no proprietary interest in much of the activity swept within the ambit of Alaska Hire [the residentpreference statute]; and the connection of the State's oil and
gas with much of the covered activity is sufficiently attenuated so that it cannot justifiably be the basis for requiring private employers to discriminate against nonresidents., 2
The Court based this finding on the application of Alaska Hire "to
employers who have no connection with the State's oil and gas,
perform no work on state land, have no contractual relationship
with the State, and receive no payment from the State."4' 3
Perhaps the most that can be said about state proprietary
power over natural resources is (1) that the privileges and immunities clause grants no exception from the normal antidiscrimination
rule when a state has no greater claim to ownership than a regulatory power over in-state resources possessed by no one; and (2)
when a state's claim of ownership conforms more closely to traditional forms of private ownership, some undefined proprietary interest gives the state somewhat greater power than it would otherwise have to discriminate against the citizens of other states, but
not complete immunity from scrutiny. In light of Toomer's criticism of the ownership theory and Hicklin's acknowledgment of the
importance of ownership while simultaneously rejecting the proprietary claim, we do not know whether McCready would be followed
today." We do not know whether Alaska could have required only
those businesses with whom it contracted directly to give Alaskans
job preference, or even whether Alaska could have refused to deal
with businesses owned by nonresidents when it granted exploitation rights.4 5 Nor can we speculate with much confidence about
what the answers to these important questions would be, for we do
not know either the nature or the extent of a state proprietary interest that the Court would perceive as a legitimate justification of
resident preference. We know only that a state is assumed to share
some undefined portion of the autonomy possessed by private proprietors. In the privileges and immunities cases, the Court has
never attempted to analyze whether the reasons that support the
42

Id.

43 Id.

at 530.

44 Compare Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause, and

State Control of NaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 86-90 (arguing that McCready
might be followed) with text at notes 239-241 infra (exclusion of nonresidents not justified).
45 For my view of these questions, see text at notes 253-254 infra.
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freedom of disposition granted private property owners give equal
support to state freedom to dispose of public property, or what
other feature of state ownership might justify departure from the
interstate equality principle.
2. The Relationship Between the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Commerce Clause. Given the common origin and
overlapping objectives of the privileges and immunities clause and
the commerce clause, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
has at various times responded to proprietary claims in a similar
manner, irrespective of which of these two clauses was in issue. Experience with the proprietary concept under the commerce clause
is more varied, however, and provides a better opportunity to evaluate the regulatory/proprietary distinction. Before undertaking
that assessment, however, a brief comparison of the ways in which
the two clauses differ will help clarify the nature of the issues arising under each.
Most commentators discussing the differences in the operative
scope of the two clauses4 stress the Court's holding that corporations are not within the category of "citizens" protected by article
IV, section 2'4 and the Court's dicta that aliens also are excluded
from the protection of that clause, 48 while noting that the commerce clause is not so limited. But looking at what activities are
covered by the two clauses, rather than who is entitled to claim
their protection, reveals more about the Court's focus in deciding
the substantive validity of state conduct challenged as discriminatory. At the most elementary level, the primary concern of the
commerce clause is business that involves more than one state,
whereas the core concern of the interstate privileges and immunities clause is the treatment received within a state by the citizens
of other states. If New York were to forbid the sale of milk pro46 E.g., J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDB00K ON CONSTIUTMoNAL LAW 276
(1978); L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 6-33, at 411 (1978).
47 E.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839). The notion that corporations are not "citizens" for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause is more venerable than sound. It is, after all,
people who do business in the corporate form, and the underlying antidiscrimination objectives of the clause can be thwarted as much by state discrimination against businesses incorporated in other states as by state discrimination against natural persons who make their
homes in other states.
48 E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 247 (1898) (semble); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (semble); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419 (1857). For
a full discussion of the constitutional limits on state discrimination against aliens who live
in other states, see note 162 infra.
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duced in New York to firms operating outside the state, the Court
would rely on the antidiscrimination portion of the commerce
clause to strike down the regulation, regardless of whether those
firms were owned by out-of-staters or by New Yorkers.49 If New
York were to forbid residents of other states to purchase milk in
New York for consumption there, the privileges and immunities
clause would provide a ready weapon to strike down the discrimination.50 Perhaps the commerce clause could also be pressed into
service in the latter case, because it protects personal interstate
movement and the consumption ban might be held an infringement on that right. But the very statement of the reasoning that
would have to be adopted indicates how much more appropriately
the privileges and immunities clause could be applied.
Differentiating the core concerns of the two clauses helps in
clarifying the position of some of the Justices who have been asked
to gauge the validity of a challenged state policy and in measuring
the persuasiveness of their positions. In Toomer v. Witsell, for example, Justice Frankfurter thought the majority had misapplied
the privileges and immunities clause, but he concurred in the result on the basis of the commerce clause. Whether or not South
Carolina's interest in the shrimp technically could be described as
an "ownership" interest, he believed the state could reserve them
for capture and local consumption by its own people.5 1 The scheme
violated the commerce clause, however, because South Carolina instead sought to reserve for its own residents the business of exporting shrimp in interstate commerce.5 2 The significance of the majority's decision to rest the case on the privileges and immunities
clause, then, was that nonresident fishermen, whether they operated in interstate commerce or restricted their business activity to
catching and selling shrimp entirely within South Carolina's borders, had to be treated on a par with South Carolina fishermen.
The commuter who works in a neighboring state in a business engaged in wholly intrastate commerce is thus protected by the privi-

4'

See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).

50 See

concurring).

Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 394 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,

11 334 U.S. at 408. It seems clear from Justice Frankfurter's approval of McCready that
he thought the state could reserve for residents both the consumption of locally caught
shrimp and the livelihood of catching the shrimp locally, although it would certainly be
possible to recognize a right to prevent all exportation while allowing nonresidents to catch
and sell shrimp locally.
52 Id. at 409.
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leges and immunities clause against the neighboring state's discrimination in favor of its own residents.
A similar focus on the separable concerns of the commerce and
the privileges and immunities clauses reveals an important weakness in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Hughes v.
Oklahoma.5 3 The majority struck down, as a violation of the commerce clause, an Oklahoma statute forbidding the out-of-state
shipment for sale of minnows caught in state waters. Justice Rehnquist argued, in part, that there was no discrimination against outof-state enterprises in favor of local businesses because this was
"not a case where a State's regulation permits residents to export
naturally seined minnows but prohibits nonresidents from so doing.",5 4 Although the argument would be relevant to a privileges
and immunities claim, the statute's "evenhanded application" 55 as
between residents and nonresidents does not support the claim
that it does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The fact
remains that the statute sought to embargo minnows for intrastate
sale only. It was therefore a classic illustration of a law discriminating against interstate commerce by excluding from interstate
commerce altogether a commodity available for intrastate
commerce.
3. The ProprietaryIdea and the Commerce Clause. Hughes
v. Oklahoma also represents the current Supreme Court view of
the claim that state "proprietary interests" in wildlife permit discriminations against interstate commerce that would clearly be impermissible if applied to interstate sales of privately owned goods.
Not too long after McCready seemed to create a proprietary exception to the interstate equality principle of the privileges and immunities clause, Geer v. Connecticut 56 did the same for the commerce
clause. Geer upheld an absolute ban on the out-of-state shipment
of game birds lawfully killed within the state by relying on "the
principle of common ownership, 57 which included state freedom
to keep the property within the state. The Court apparently recognized that the state autonomy derived from common ownership of
wildlife within the state differed from individual freedom to deal
with private property, in that
53441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979).

"Id. at 344.
55Id.
" 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
57 Id. at 526.
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the power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this
common ownership, is to be exercised like all other powers of
government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not
as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals
as distinguished from the public good.5 8
Nonetheless, the Court used the fact of common ownership to justify embargoes of wild game without permitting embargoes of privately owned commodities.
But the recognition that state freedom to control public property differed in character from private freedom to control private
property carried the seeds of Geer's destruction. When Louisiana
tried to force the relocation of the shrimp packing industry by declaring the uncaught shrimp in Louisiana waters to be state property and by withholding from those who caught them the property
right to export shrimp meat unless the heads and hulls were removed in Louisiana, the Court, in Foster-FountainPacking Co. v.
Haydel, 9 was able to distinguish Geer. The ground for the distinction was that a state that retains animal life for local consumption
is acting "in its sovereign capacity as representative of the people," 60 but a state that permits such creatures to be shipped in
interstate commerce necessarily "put[s] an end to the trust upon
which the State is deemed to own or control the [wildlife] for the
benefit of its people." 1 As a necessary result, said Justice Butler,
those who capture wildlife that a state does not withhold entirely
from interstate commerce "become entitled to the rights of private
ownership and protection of the commerce clause.' 62
Geer's destruction was completed by Hughes. After Toomer
described the wildlife ownership theory. as a "fiction," it was but a
small step for the Court in Hughes to overrule Geer and find that
the usual criteria of commerce clause analysis should apply to the
regulation of wildlife, just as they apply to the regulation of goods
in private possession. Together, Foster-Fountainand Geer had
created the anomaly of a state possessing greater power to prevent
interstate shipment of wildlife completely than to limit the condi-

5

Id. at 529.

59 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
60Id. at 11.
61Id. at 13.
62 Id.
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tions under which interstate shipment might take place. 3 It was
time to recognize, as the Court already had under the privileges
and immunities clause, that even if state ownership might sometimes permit greater freedom to control the disposition of property, only actual state ownership, and not fictional claims of community control that in fact amount to regulation more than
ownership, could qualify.
But the proprietary exception to the antidiscrimination principle of commerce clause doctrine persists in other forms. Following
the lead of several state court cases,6 on three recent occasions the
Supreme Court has upheld state purchasing and selling policies
that discriminate in favor of in-state business. Generally, if a state
interferes with private sector market choices through tax or regulatory schemes whose purpose is to favor in-state business to the relative disadvantage of out-of-state business, or that use residencediscriminatory means to accomplish otherwise permissible ends,
the Court applies a "virtually per se rule of invalidity. 6 5 When,
however, the state itself is buying or selling, instead of interfering
with the buying or selling decisions of private parties in the interstate market, the Court has generally refused to apply either the
nondiscrimination rule or the rule that even nondiscriminatory
state programs must not unduly burden interstate commerce.66
6S 441 U.S. at 335.
4 E.g., City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 533, 514 P.2d 454 (1973); Schrey v.
Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 75 Ariz. 282, 255 P.2d 604 (1953); City of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo.
329, 266 P. 214 (1928); In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911); People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 IlM.2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975); State ex reL. Collins v.
Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258 (1917); Allen v. Labsap,
188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926 (1905); Hersey v. Nelson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30 (1913); Tribune
& Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904 (1898).
65 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (regulation); Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977) (taxation).
" For a brief discussion of these two rules, see note 5 supra. The Court has not accepted the fact of state ownership alone as justifying a state's discrimination against nonresidents. In South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938),
the Court did place some emphasis upon state ownership of state highways when it rejected
the claim that a law setting maximum weight and width limits for trucks using those highways unduly burdened interstate commerce. Justice Stone emphasized that "[u]nlike the
railroads, local highways are built, owned and maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions." Id. at 187. But even on that assumption, he made plain that the burden was
permissible only "so long as the state action does not discriminate," id. at 189, for the "commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce,
whatever its form or method," id. at 185. Explaining the ban on discrimination, Justice
Stone wrote that "when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests
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Thus, in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 67 the Court, without an

opinion, summarily upheld the right of a state to confine its
purchases of goods and services for the operation of government to
suppliers operating within the state. Later, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,""the Court articulated for the first time the view
that the commerce clause does not limit state proprietary decisions
in the market. That case involved a Maryland subsidy program
designed to stimulate the removal of cars abandoned in the state
through the payment of a bonus for each "hulk" destroyed. That
bonus was split between any licensed wrecker that delivered the
hulk to a scrap processor and the processor itself. Thus the state
was essentially either purchasing or subsidizing the removal and
destruction of these hulks. An out-of-state processor challenged an
amendment to the original subsidy scheme that effectively eased
the bonus eligibility requirements for deliveries to in-state processors. The Court decided that the commerce clause does not even
"require independent justification" for discrimination in the expenditure of state funds for the purchase, "in effect, of a potential
article of interstate commerce." 69 Justice Powell held that
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.

'7 0

Finally, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,7 1 the Court

elevated the marketplace participation exemption to a "general
rule" when it upheld South Dakota's right, as owner of a cement
plant, to prefer private businesses within the state over out-ofstate businesses when selling the cement, at least when the supply
could not satisfy the demand of both groups. Although admitting
that the "general rule of Alexandria Scrap. . . necessarily admits
of exceptions, 71 2 the Court nonetheless found the state preference

for a state-owned enterprise's in-state customers to be a classic instance of permissible proprietary choice.
What accounts for the significant assumption that state buywithin the state." Id. at 185 n.2. See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429, 444 n.18 (1978).
67 409 U.S. 904 (mem.), aff'g 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Justices Brennan and
White voted to hear the case.
- 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
69 Id. at 808-09.
70 Id. at 810 (footnote omitted).
7.1 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
72

Id. at 440.
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ing and selling policies are generally immune from commerce
clause limits that apply to state interference with interstate dealings among private buyers and sellers? In Reeves, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion offered a general defense of the "distinction . . . between States as market participants and States as
market regulators. ' 7 3 Drawing from a variety of sources, including
the state cases that had adopted the same distinction, 7' Justice
Blackmun provided essentially four justifications for the wider latitude afforded state proprietary activity. The first is the historical
argument that the commerce clause was "principally" intended to
inhibit state tax and regulatory measures "impeding free private
trade in the national marketplace," leaving the "States themselves
to operate freely in the free market." 75 The second is a curious
blend of the state's sovereign responsibilities as guardian and trustee of its people and the state's right to be just like any trader in
the private sector, with the power to choose with whom to deal."
The third is an assumed obligation of evenhandedness. Because
state proprietary activities often are subject to federal taxes and
regulations in the same way that private businesses are, those activities should be as immune from commerce clause restraints as
private enterprise is. 7 7 The final justification is the practical difficulty of assessing the validity of state purchasing and selling poli78
cies under traditional commerce clause criteria.
None of these justifications will carry the day. The Framers'
principal concern in fashioning the commerce clause may well have
been state interference with interstate private trade. There is, however, no indication that they thought about state proprietary policy at all. If state resident preference restrictions in proprietary
policy threaten the interstate unification or free-trade goals of the
commerce clause, it is difficult to see why commerce clause limits
would not be appropriate. Just as the extent of congressional
power under the commerce clause has changed dramatically from
what was consciously contemplated at the time of its adoption, so
might the nature of commerce clause restrictions on state power
change if the needs of interstate commerce and the disruptive effects of state action affecting interstate commerce have evolved so
Id. at 436. He said that the distinction "makes good sense and sound law." Id.
"Id. at 437 n.9; see note 64 supra.
1 447 U.S. at 437.
, Id. at 438-39.
"Id. at 439.
's Id.
'*
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as to render disturbing what once might have been innocuous. 7 e

Nor will the state's role as "sovereign trader" suffice to explain
the regulatory/proprietary distinction. The states of course act as
guardians and trustees for their people when they regulate as well
as when they trade. Moreover, when they trade (and particularly
when they choose to prefer residents) they are more likely than
private traders to be motivated by noneconomic political influences."0 Precisely because state proprietary activity is a blend of
both private and public business, it is not sufficient to assume that
the state should have the same freedom to choose business policy
as private business. In fact, the differing nature of state and private proprietary interests recognized in Geers1 prevents that assumption. The very act in question-favoritism of in-state residents without regard to profit-is one that belies reliance on
concepts of private property; it is a public act.
The evenhandedness rationale fares no better, for it too begs
the question. Why is it important to allow state business to be conducted with the same freedom as private business? Surely the constitutional limitations imposed on states are not generally thought
to be unfairly imposed simply because they are not also applied to
private concentrations of power. As Paul Freund reminded us long
ago, private aggregations of wealth may have as detrimental an impact on the maintenance of a national free-trade unit as state interferences with interstate commerce, and yet the commerce clause
The general point was well expressed by Roscoe Pound:
IT]he balance of nation and state has not remained constant. The relative political
position of nation and state has shifted with the increasing economic unification of the
country, with the growth of enterprises and businesses transcending state lines, and
with the advent of rapid transportation and instantaneous communication. Many
things that were local have become national. But it is one of the conspicuous merits of
the federal constitution that, as it was drawn up before the coming of the nineteenth
century tendency to govern everything by precise rule, it did not attempt detailed laying down of what was national and what local, but left the details to be settled by
experience under a general principle. Thus the balance of the national and the local,
characteristic of our polity, can maintain itself, since changes in relative economic importance affect the application of the principle but not the principle itself.
Pound, Law and Federal Government, in FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 3, 16-17
(1942). The economic significance of state proprietary discrimination is discussed in F. MELDER, STATE AND LOCAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC SECTIONALISM 12-36 (1937); Melder, The Economics of Trade Barriers, 16 IND.
79

L.J. 127, 139-40 (1940).
80 As Justice Powell argued in dissent, a "state frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic concerns." 447 U.S. at 450.
S1 See text at note 58 supra.
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limitation applies only to the states. 2 If the reason for this different treatment is the perception that state discrimination against
interstate commerce is more likely to lead to interstate friction
than similar policies on the part of private business, that state and
private business are equally subject to federal regulation is irrelevant to the underlying goals of the commerce clause.
Finally, the argument based on the practical difficulty of assessing state proprietary activity also is unconvincing. Subtlety,
complexity, and political controversy are hardly unknown in traditional commercq clause analysis. Moreover, if the Court is prepared to weigh incommensurable values in regulatory cases, 8 what
is more difficult about weighing the values of legitimate proprietary choice against its impact on interstate activity? Perhaps enforcement seems more difficult because a state may just "happen
to choose" resident suppliers and customers without announcing a
policy of resident preference. But the Court could easily forbid
overt policies of preference, because they are most likely to create
interstate friction, and perhaps it might allow nonresidents to
prove discrimination in practice as well. Moreover, an exception
that sometimes allows departure from the "virtually per se rule"
against discrimination
creates its own complexity and
controversy.84
More fundamental than the Court's inability to articulate
sound reasons for distinguishing regulatory from proprietary activity, however, is the Court's own suggestion that the distinction is
Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 563 (1954).
Compare Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-43 (1978) (Powell,
J.) (weighing safety purpose of regulation against degree of interference with interstate commerce) with id. at 448-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (contending that the Court will not
engage in such a weighing process if the asserted safety purpose is not illusory).
, For one thing, because so much rests on whether state conduct is labeled "regulatory" or "proprietary," judges sensitive to other considerations may strain to choose the
desired label and reach controversial results. After Reeves, for example, a divided panel of
the Fifth Circuit held that a state rule giving resident farmers a preferred right to lease
from the state the most desirable sales locations at the state-owned farmers market violated
the commerce clause. Smith v. Department of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980).
The majority concluded that the state was a market regulator, rather than a market participant, because it did not produce, buy, or sell the goods offered for sale in the marketplace.
Id. at 1083. The dissent deemed the state conduct clearly proprietary, however, because the
transaction relevant to the contested policy was the leasing of state property, not the sale of
goods by the tenants. Id. at 1087-88 (Randall, J., dissenting).
The dissent had the better of this argument. The state chose to prefer residents as
renters here, just as South Dakota chose to prefer residents as purchasers in Reeves. For the
view that the leasing policy should have been upheld, not because it should escape any
scrutiny, but because it is justifiable favoritism, see note 224 infra.
32
83

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:487

not necessarily determinative.8 5 Broad exceptions to the distinction
cause one to wonder whether the distinction has meaningful content. Reeves raises the possibility of a gigantic exception to the
liberal treatment of state proprietary choices by suggesting that
when the state owns and disposes of natural resources, as distinct
from products made from them, a policy of resident preference
might indeed be subject to traditional commerce clause analysis.8 6
None of the Court's four justifications for treating state proprietary activity with greater deference than state taxation or regulation would support the further distinction betweenthe state's proprietary activities as natural resource entrepreneur and as operator
of any other kind of business. If there is some reason to distinguish
the case of state-owned natural resources from other state-owned
property, the regulatory/proprietary distinction is not it.
All this is not necessarily to say that Reeves was wrongly decided. What is striking about the Court's generalized attempt to
justify the market participation exemption from usual commerce
clause restrictions, however, is that it did not attempt to establish
any intrinsic value for the state's freedom to choose a resident
preference policy. Historical intention, comparison with the prerogatives of the private sector, and the practical difficulties of judicial review do not speak to any intrinsic attribute of state sovereignty that might make it substantively important to allow South
87
Dakota to adopt its resident preference policy.
85

447 U.S. at 440.
88 Id. at 443-44. This portion of the Reeves opinion is discussed in text at notes 220-223
infra.
87 In a recent article that explores the uses of the regulatory/proprietary distinction in
constitutional law generally and concludes that the distinction is often used to mean different things in different contexts, Professors Wells and Hellerstein devote a portion of their
discussion to its use in commerce clause doctrine. Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 23, at
1121-35, 1139-41. In particular, they examine whether the immunity granted state proprietary choices is a way of (1) putting aside a category of state actions that affect commerce in
only trivial ways, (2) protecting those state interests that truly parallel private business interests, or (3) recognizing that state autonomy to distribute state-owned resources outweighs
the national interest in "unfettered commerce among the states." Id. at 1127-34.
With respect to the first explanation, Wells and Hellerstein recognize that there is no
particular reason to suppose that proprietary policies affect the flow of commerce much less
than regulatory policies do. Id. at 1127-28. I would add that not only has the Court never
suggested that the extent of the restriction of interstate commerce, rather than its character,
figures in the exemption of state marketplace activity from commerce clause scrutiny, but
available indications point in the opposite direction. Justice Powell, who wrote the Court's
opinion in Alexandria Scrap, dissented in Reeves. He found the cases distinguishable, because when a state bids up the price of an article of commerce, it does not burden the flow
of interstate commerce, because the incentive to sell in-state is merely the higher price,
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Fundamental Activities and the Scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause

The Supreme Court recently attempted to define the residuum
of state power to prefer residents after the demands of insterstate
equality have been satisfied. In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commis-

leaving an out-of-state business free to compete for the article by raising its price. When a
state's marketing policy cuts off supply to out-of-state customers, however, there is no possibility for an out-of-state business to compete with its in-state competitors for the limited
supply of articles to be sold. 447 U.S. at 452-53. The majority's response in Reeves was not
that the burden on commerce was minimal in both cases, but, to the contrary, that the
burden in Alexandria Scrap was also substantial and that this did not matter in light of the
proprietary nature of the state's conduct. Id. at 435 n.7. Furthermore, these are not just
cases where the burden imposed on interstate commerce is in issue. These are classic instances of discrimination against out-of-state business, and so they would seem to be likely
candidates for "per se invalidity" under the commerce clause regardless of the burden
imposed.
Wells and Hellerstein also agree that the proprietary exemption cannot be justified as a
means of recognizing "the government's legitimate business-like interests," because resident
preference has political, not economic, objectives. 66 VA. L. REv. at 1129. They are somewhat more receptive to the state fiscal autonomy explanation. They suggest that "[i]f the
cases in this area ultimately reflect the judgment that the states' interest in distributing
their own resources as they see fit overrides the nation's interest in unfettered commerce
among the states, then the governmental-proprietary distinction may be performing a constructive function in commerce clause analysis." Id. at 1134. They ask whether there is a
better method for accommodating the state and national interests than using this distinction, and conclude that it "depends on one's view of the nature of the appropriate accommodation." Id. Thus, "[i]f . . . one has concluded as a matter of principle that the state's
interest in spending its money as it sees fit will always prevail over the values protected by
the commerce clause . . . then reliance on the governmental-proprietary distinction as a
decisional mechanism may produce satisfactory results, even if it obscures the underlying
rationale for them." Id.
If one accepts the qualifications in this less-than-wholehearted endorsement of the distinction, it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion. But one can criticize the notion that
state fiscal autonomy interests will "always prevail." Although the Court undoubtedly
desires to protect some state autonomy to distribute state resources, that value surely is not
absolute enough to justify constitutional immunity for some group of distributional choices
labeled "proprietary." There is no neat division between public and private sectors that can
explain a decision to leave the state free to reserve state monies, goods, and services for the
exclusive benefit of state residents, but prohibit the states from treating private resources
within the state in the same way. State exclusion of nonresidents from equal access to, or
any use of, state highways, courts, parks and beaches, libraries, and public transportation
systems, as well as state-owned natural resources, would present difficult issues that could
not be glossed over by saying that, because state resource distribution policies are at issue,
the commerce clause, or the privileges and immunities clause for that matter, would impose
no restraint. Even though state distributional autonomy is an important value, it is necessary to understand why the autonomy exists, so that it can properly be related to the important value of limiting state power to discriminate against nonresident individuals and businesses. State interests in public resource distribution cannot be made "trumps" without
offending our intuitive sense of what interstate equality requires.
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sion, ss

the Court committed itself to the view that the interstate
privileges and immunities clause only requires the state to treat
residents and nonresidents "without unnecessary distinctions"
when the nonresident seeks to "engage in an essential activity or
exercise a basic right."8 The theory behind this limitation is that,
unless the right or activity is "fundamental," state discrimination
against nonresidents does not "frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union."90 Accordingly, state discrimination with respect
to nonfundamental activities "does not fall within the purview of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause."9 1

In Baldwin, the Court held recreational elk hunting to be
nonfundamental, 92 with the result that the privileges and immunities clause did not prevent Montana from imposing on nonresidents a hunting license fee at least 7.5 times as great as the fee
charged residents.9 If the sport had been held a fundamental activity, presumably the standard established in Toomer v. Witsell
for judging the compatibility of policies disadvantaging nonresidents with the command of the privileges and immunities clause
would have applied. The state would have had to show that there
were substantial reasons, apart from nonresidence, for the fee differential and, further, that the degree of discrimination bore a
close relation to those reasons.9 That was a showing the state
could not make.9 5 Instead, the state was only required to justify
the discrimination under the minimum rationality standard of review of the equal protection clause. That standard essentially
leaves the state free to draw any distinction based on residence
" 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
8,Id. at 387.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 388.
92 Id.
93 The license fee scheme is described in id. at 373-74.
94 Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is
not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there
is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in
each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course,
be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (footnote omitted).
." See Baldivn v. Fish & Game Conm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 402-05 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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that is not totally arbitrary.9"
As a method of separating permissible from impermissible resident preferences, the fundamental/nonfundamental distinction
may have even less to commend it than the regulatory/proprietary
distinction. To begin with, the idea that disadvantaging nonresidents more than is necessary to compensate for .any peculiar
problems they pose will "frustrate the purposes of the formation of
the Union" only when the disadvantage affects a fundamental activity reflects either an unduly limited view of what those purposes
are, or an empirically dubious assumption about human nature. In
Baldwin, Justice Blackmun described the category of fundamental
activities sufficient to trigger the protection of the privileges and
immunities clause as those "basic to the maintenance or well-being
of the Union" or "basic to the livelihood of the Nation. ' '97 If he
meant to say that only those activities crucial to the economic
prosperity of the nation qualify, his view cannot be supported. The
comity clauses were designed to promote political and social cohesion among the people of the several states, as well as to establish a
favorable framework for economic growth. The Framers sought to
ensure a unifying hospitality, as well as commercial productivity,
when they acted, in the words of the Articles of Confederation, "to
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different States in this Union."' s He may instead
have meant that, unless an activity is fundamental, unnecessary
discriminations against nonresidents do not realistically threaten
the social, economic, or political unification of the nation. If so, his
conclusion seems at odds with the way people normally react to
unjustifiable denials or limitations of access to opportunities readfly available to insiders. It is easy to imagine a nonresident feeling
greater hostility towards a state that excludes him totally from, or
charges him vastly more for, a recreational activity available to residents than towards a state that charges a little more for a commercial fishing license than can be justified by the fact of nonresidence. Yet under Baldwin, the former discrimination is immune
from the limitations of the clause while the latter is subject to
them. If California entirely excluded nonresidents from its state
'" See id. at 388-91.

" Id. at 388.
98

ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. IV; see note 2 supra. Even if one believes the com-

ity clauses were intended solely to create a common market, social consequences are impor-

tant. The more hostility a nonresident perceives directed at him, the less likely he is to
trade in the state.
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beaches, would the Court really find the exclusion permissible?
Limiting the cost of maintaining the beaches would surely make
the distinction rational for purposes of equal protection, and under
Baldwin the privileges and immunities clause seemingly would not
apply because the nonresident sought access to a nonfundamental
recreational activity. But it is hard to square such a result with the
interstate unification aims of the Constitution.
A second objection to the use of the fundamentality criterion
is the vexing problem of definition. The Court declined to explain
in Baldwin what generally distinguishes fundamental or basic privileges and immunities. Instead, it simply decided that whatever the
dividing line, recreational elk hunting was certainly on the
nonfundamental side.99 Justice Blackmun did suggest, however,
that he had in mind the "modern . . . sense" of fundamentality

applied by Justice Washington 00 in the seminal case of Corfield v.
°1
1

Coryell.

But just what is the "modern sense" Justice Blackmun had in
9

436 U.S. at 388.

100 Id. at 387. Justice Blackmun qualified his reliance on Justice Washington, however,

and made it clear that he was not invoking the concept of natural rights, on which Justice
Washington "seemingly relied" in part. Id.
101 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Justice Washington's classic passage
reads:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities
which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental privileges are, it would perhaps be
more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety;, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of
one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take,
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned
as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which
may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
Id. at 551-52. Professor Ely suggests that "Washington purported to place limits but ended
up with a virtually infinite reference ... ." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 28 (1980).
Even if Washington's understanding of what was fundamental "wasn't much of a limitation," id. at 29, however, Baldwin creates an urgent need for some definition.
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mind? It is important to understand that it cannot be the same
sense in which the term is used in modern equal protection analysis. Under the equal protection clause, the Court normally upholds
the constitutionality of a state classification if it is at all rational to
single out the disadvantaged group for treatment different from
that afforded the advantaged group.10 2 But if the classification impinges upon a "fundamental interest," the Court will uphold the
classification only if the state can demonstrate that the classification is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. 03 The category of fundamental interests in equal protection doctrine is quite
limited,10 4 and the Burger Court has rejected any attempts to expand its scope. 10 5 If it took a fundamental equal protection interest
to activate the protection of the privileges and immunities clause,
the clause would be rendered superfluous. As Baldwin itself indicates, nonresidents as a class are protected by the equal protection
clause when they are within another state's jurisdiction, and given
the presence of a fundamental equal protection interest, strict
scrutiny would apply without any help from the comity clauses. 0 6
Moreover, the Court has never indicated any intention to define
the category of fundamental privileges and immunities this narrowly. For example, the right to pursue a particular livelihood,
which the Court never hesitates to find protected under the privileges and immunities clause,L07 is not a fundamental interest under

the equal protection clause. 0 Furthermore, whenever the privi101

See L. TRBE, supra note 46, §§ 16-2 to -4. See generally Gunther, The Supreme

Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
103 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969); L. TRIBE, supra note 46,
§§ 16-7 to -12; Developments, supra note 102, at 1120-23, 1127-31.
104

As Professor Gunther pointed out. "The list of interests identified as fundamental

by the Warren Court was in fact quite modest: voting, criminal appeals, and the right of
interstate travel were the prime examples." Gunther, supra note 102, at 8-9.
100 E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see
Gunther, supra note 102, at 12-15.
I" Voting is an exception. Although the right to vote is a fundamental equal protection
interest with respect to classifications among state residents, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969), nonresidents have no constitutional claim to participate in another state's political process. See text at notes 142-147 infra.
107 E.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415
(1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418
(1871).
108 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961); William.on v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v. Board of
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leges and immunities clause applies under the fundamentality doctrine, the Toomer standard of review presumably governs the
validity of any residence classification. That standard, although
considerably stricter than minimum rationality, is not as rigid as
that applicable to classifications impinging on equal protection
fundamental interests.10 9 Fundamentality could not mean the same
thing in both contexts, therefore, unless nonresidents as a class
were to be given less judicial protection than similarly situated residents. This would be a curious result, considering that the Constitution originally singled out nonresidents for special protection by
the privileges and immunities clause and that they now have the
additional safeguard of the equal protection clause.1 10
In fact, it is the branch of equal protection doctrine that varies
the level of scrutiny according to the nature of the trait used to
classify, 11 rather than the fundamentality of the interest affected
by the classification, that most closely parallels the concerns under
the privileges and immunities clause. Independently of the interest
affected, the Court examines government classifications more
closely when the disadvantaged group is identified by traits such as
race, 112 gender, 113 alienage,11 4 or illegitimacy"1 5 than when the basis
of classification creates less risk that a group was disadvantaged
because it was the object of prejudice or insensitivity. The priviRiver Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
109 Toomer requires a "substantial," but not a "compelling," reason for the discrimina-

tion, and a "close," but not a "necessary," relationship between the degree of discrimination
and the valid reasons for it. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948), quoted in note 94
supra. As others have noted, see L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 6-33, at 411 n.17; Note, Hughes
v. Oklahoma and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission: The Commerce Clause and State
Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. L. REv. 1145, 1146 n.9 (1980), the Toomer standard
closely resembles the "intermediate" level of scrutiny the Court applies in cases of gender
discrimination, namely, whether the gender classification serves "important governmental
objectives" and is "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives," Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
110 But see note 106 supra.
m See generally L. TRmE, supra note 46, §§ 16-13 to -29.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). See also Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per
12

curiam).
11 See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980); Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-12 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88
(1973).
M1See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-46 (1973); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
115 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 172-76 (1972).
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leges and immunities clause similarly provides special protection
for nonresidents as a class because they might otherwise be systematically disadvantaged. Moreover, nonresidents possess two
characteristics that generally call for at least some special judicial
solicitude under the equal protection clause, whether or not fundamental activities are affected: they lack the right to vote, and they
are vulnerable to local prejudice or insensitivity. 11 6 It is undoubtedly because of the "quasi-suspect" nature of the residence classification that the Court applies an elevated standard of review when
the clause is triggered. But that only makes it harder to understand why the Court's approach to residence classifications should
differ from its general approach to other classifications eliciting
special scrutiny. Nonresidents, despite the added protection of the
privileges and immunities clause, are the only "quasi-suspect"
group for which there is no.special review unless there is also a
"fundamental" activity affected. The result is inexplicably to denigrate the constitutional concern with the use of state residence as a
basis for classification and to shift the focus to the fundamentality
of the activity in dispute.
Furthermore, even if it is clear that fundamentality must be
defined differently for the privileges and immunities clause than
for the equal protection clause, it still is unclear what the touchstone of definition is to be. Under equal protection doctrine, the
Court has eschewed the process of comparing the "relative societal
significance" of different activities or benefits as a way of measuring fundamentality, 17 and it has confined the concept of fundamental interests to those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.""1 It is unclear why the Court should be more
willing to undertake to rank activities on a scale of social importance in order to determine which are fundamental enough to trigger the application of the privileges and immunities clause. The
process may differ somewhat from that necessary in the equal protection context, but it is just as difficult.
In short, the fundamentality doctrine reaffirmed in Baldwin
116 In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), Justice

Powell summarized "the traditional indicia of suspectness" as belonging to "the class...
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." For a relevant comparison of the status
of aliens who reside in a state and nonresidents, see text at notes 152-163 infra.
11" San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
11 Id. at 33-34.
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reflects neither an appreciation of the instances in which interstate
divisiveness is likely to result from residence classifications, nor
the fundamental interest or suspect classification approaches to
equal protection, nor any other discernible concept that can be
tied to the purposes of the privileges and immunities clause. It is,
instead, an historical relic lacking independent content. Furthermore, it deflects attention from the real differences between a
state's relationship to its own residents and its relationship to the
residents of other states, differences that might justify deviation
from a strict rule of equal treatment.
II.

ACCOMMODATING THE CLAIMS OF STATE "CITIZENSHIP" AND

INTERSTATE EQUALITY

The Framers of the Constitution were compromisers. The
demonstrated defects of the Articles of Confederation led them to
seek a stronger national government,' 19 but state loyalties and fear
of centralized authority compelled the retention of the states as
separate political communities.120 As a result, the Framers
chose-or settled for-a Constitution that is, in the words of
Madison, "in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. 1 21 That compromise on the fundamental governmental structure of the union has provided a
breeding ground for conflicts between state and national authority
ever since. In the context of state discrimination on the basis of
residence, there is an inherent conflict between the objectives of
the Constitution's interstate equality provisions and the continued
significance of state government.
At first glance, the Constitution appears to eliminate any room
for conflict by providing an ironclad rule against state residence
discrimination. The unqualified language of the privileges and immunities clause122 suggests that the architects who designed a federal structure composed of constituent states with full government
powers generally diminished only by the powers delegated to the
national government also deliberately included in their original set
of plans a comprehensive ban on state discrimination against the
citizens of other states. Moreover, the national free-trade objec1x' See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1, 15, 21, 22, 30, 85 (Hamilton), 38, 41, 42 (Madison).
120 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 17, 31, 32, 34 (Hamilton), 45, 46 (Madison).
121 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (Madison), at 246 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [all subsequent
page references to The Federalistare to the Rossiter edition].
121 Quoted in text at note 6 supra.
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tives of the commerce clause seem incompatible with any state
authority to treat in-state business more favorably than out-ofstate business.
Yet the continuation of state government as contemplated by
the Framers necessarily requires recognition of some state authority to treat residents more favorably than nonresidents 12 and some
power to deviate from a completely open economy. 24 In the elkhunting case, Justice Blackmun said that "[s]ome distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this
is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted;
other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose or the development of a single Union of those
1 25 The statement is helpful only insofar as it suggests that
States.1
our federal structure contemplates the validity of some residence
distinctions. It does not help clarify which distinctions legitimately
reflect the separate existence of the states. Nor does it seem to recognize the real possibility that some residence distinctions may simultaneously reflect our federal structure and hinder the objectives of union, so that evaluation of their validity requires a choice
between competing values. A theory that would separate permissible from impermissible residence distinctions should take account
of the aims of the constitutional interstate equality provisions that,
if not absolutely, at least presumptively bar state discrimination
against nonresidents; isolate the attributes of state government
that prima facie will justify state resident preference; and articulate any special factors tending to rebut the prima facie case and
shift the balance back in favor of interstate equality.
A.

The Constitutional Rationale for Interstate Equality

One modern explanation of the interstate equality provisions
focuses on the fact that residents of one state have no voter control
over the representatives of other states. It suggests that the Framers, sensitive to this absence of political accountability, substituted
constitutional equality principles to protect the interests of the unrepresented nonresident. 126 As Professor Ely puts it, the constitu123

See the passage from Toomer v. Witsell set forth in note 94 supra for the Court's

recognition that "[1]ike many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities
clause is not an absolute." 334 U.S. at 396.
124See text at notes 147-149 infra.
1'5Baldwin v. Fish & Game Cornm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
126 See, e.g., Simson, DiscriminationAgainst Nonresidents and the Privileges and Im-
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tional protection of nonresidents "proceeds by what amounts to a
system of virtual representation: by constitutionally tying the fate
of outsiders to the fate of those possessing political power, the
'127
framers insured that their interests would be well looked after.
This analysis may demonstrate how the equality objective was to
be achieved, but it does not tell us why it was thought important
that nonresidents as a class should be "well looked after." This is
especially puzzling because certain classes of disenfranchised residents lacked any similar constitutional protection. 128
The reason is clear. The Framers adopted the constitutional
ban on state discrimination against nonresidents and interstate relationships primarily as an instrument of national unification.
Hamilton deemed the privileges and immunities clause "the basis
of the union. 129 The antidiscrimination principle of the commerce
clause similarly was designed to forestall divisions along state
lines.1 30 However divided on the specifics of application, the Court
has never doubted the centrality of this guiding purpose.
At a fundamental level, then, the goals of these clauses are no
less comprehensive than the objects of union. Decreasing the significance of state residence tends to strengthen interstate attachments and thereby diminish the likelihood of interstate conflicts. 13 1
At the same time, external threats to the country's security are
more likely to be deterred if the nation is cohesive and not split
along state lines. 3 2 Economically, the establishment of a federal
free-trade unit was designed not only to contribute to the nation's
political solidarity, but also to produce material prosperity and to
maximize individual opportunity. 3 3 The same reasons explain why

munities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 384-85 (1979).
12J.. ELY, supra note 101, at 83.
128 Professor Simson suggests that although the Framers were moved by a general commitment to representative government, they thought disenfranchised residents, unlike nonresidents, would receive political protection "by virtue of kinship [with] or other ties" to
enfranchised residents. Simson, supra note 126, at 384-85. Whatever may be said of women
or children, however, it seems historically doubtful that nonwhites or aliens had, or were
perceived to have had, better surrogate political representation in state legislative halls than
did the citizens of other states.
12I THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Hamilton), at 478.
130 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949).
131 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-9, 11 (Hamilton).
12 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3-5 (Jay).

The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this
federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce, but

12"

the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions....
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the privileges and immunities clause prescribed that wherever a
member of the nation traveled he would be treated the same as
local residents.1 4 By restricting state power to limit or discourage
either creation of advantageous interstate relationships or the nonresident's pursuit of advantages found in other states, the nondiscrimination principles foster cumulative attachments among people in different states, maximize individual opportunities for selfbetterment, and increase aggregate productivity. At the same time,
they leave people free to make their home in one state without
sacrificing the opportunity to share in the bounty found in others.
True, the states are constitutionally forbidden to exclude individuals who wish to take up permanent residence within their borders, 3 5 and this right of interstate migration limits state authority
to treat bona fide, albeit recently arrived, residents less well than
longer-term residents. 18 But the Constitution goes even further:
the interstate equality guarantees protect nonresidents who do not
wish to relocate their homes, but do wish to travel to or through, or
trade with, other states in order to take advantage of opportunities
available in other parts of the country. In this way, the range of
choices open to members of the union is enhanced.
B. State Government and State "Citizenship"
The objective of national unification certainly could be
achieved just as well, if not better, by a unitary national governOur system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has
been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949).
I See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-32 (1871); cases cited note 107
supra.
135 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
13S6Thus the Court has invalidated, as "penalties" for exercising the right of interstate
travel, state durational residency requirements as a condition of eligibility to receive nonemergency hospitalization or medical care, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974), to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and to receive welfare assistance, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In each of these cases, the residence requirement was not supported by any compelling interest. Shapiro expressly reserved the
question of whether all such requirements were penalties. Id. at 638 n.21. See Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393 (1975), upholding a one-year durational residency requirement before a new
resident could use the state courts to sue a nonresident for divorce.
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ment structure as by the composite of national and federal government created by the Constitution. But the Framers did retain state
government, and in doing so they made some basic assumptions
about the nature of state communities and the scope of state powers and functions. These assumptions compel recognition of some
state power to deviate from the apparently flat prohibition against
state discrimination on the basis of residence.
Fundamentally, the states are, and were intended to be, quasisovereign political communities, rather than conveniently local administrative departments of the national government designed to
assist in the implementation of national policy. 1 7 They are republican (that is, representative) governments, accountable to local
constituencies. 138 They possess a large measure of lawmaking authority, independent of the lawmaking power of other states and
the federal government, to govern the people and events within
their fixed territorial boundaries. 13 9 The purpose of that lawmaking
power is to provide public benefits and services within the territories they govern. The states' ability to experiment in a local setting
is a frequently cited advantage of our federal structure,' 40 and in
light of the freedom of interstate migration,' 4 1 the resulting pattern of different packages of collective goods in each state provides
the nation's residents with a wide range of alternatives from which
to choose.
These basic features of state government necessarily imply
some valid distinctions between residents and nonresidents. Consider the question of eligibility to vote in state elections. If the
states are to be representative governments exercising their powers
within the state's boundaries, their constituencies must surely be
defined by the line between those who make their home in the
state and those who do not. The very existence of a constitutional

"I7
See

THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison), at 292-93.

1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...." See THE FEDERALIST No. 43
(Madison), at 274-78.
113See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison), at 292-93. The structural foundation of the
federal system is expressed in the tenth amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
140 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-

ments without risk to the rest of the country."
141 See cases cited note 135 supra.
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guarantee of equality of treatment when a citizen of one state travels to another presupposes the absence of voting power. A system
of "virtual representation" would be unnecessary if a state could
not deny nonresidents the right to vote in its elections. The basic
assumptions must be that no person has a right to vote in more
than one state's elections, that the state of one's residence is the
appropriate state in which to vote, and that in all the other states
the nonresident is to be protected by constitutional guarantees
against discrimination on the basis of residence.
Denying the vote to nonresidents is, of course, not the same as
denying the vote to those who recently became residents. Because
the right to vote is a fundamental political interest, the Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny to selective distribution of the
franchise among different classes of residents 142 and has struck
down lengthy durational residency requirements disenfranchising
bona fide, but recently arrived, residents. 143 At the same time,
however, the Court has reaffirmed state "power to require that vot'144
ers be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision.
Fundamental as the right to vote is, "[a]n appropriately defined
and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be
necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny. 1 45 The new resident is no longer entitled to vote in the state
he left, 46 and the °nonresident may be denied the right to vote in
the states that he merely visits. Though a state may not interfere
with an individual's choice to take up residence within its borders,
and is limited in the criteria it may use to ensure that the individual is a bona fide resident, it may require the individual to make a
choice. He is entitled to the status of voting member in only one
147
state political community at a time.
Just as the basic conception of states as discrete political com142 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
,S See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S.
679, 680 (1973) (per curiam) (approving 50-day durational residency requirements "to prepare adequate voter records and protect [the state's] electoral processes from possible
frauds").
144 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
145 Id. at 343-44; see L. TRmE, supra note 46, § 13-12.
146 Cf. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978) (per curiam) (dictum) (constitutional
right to travel does not require a state to continue to pay welfare benefits to former residents after they move out of the state).
147 Accord, Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4 IowA L. BULL. 3, 5 (1918).
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munities implicitly justifies restricting the right to vote in state
elections to residents, so, too, the Constitution's fundamental assumptions about state powers and functions implicitly suggest the
legitimacy of additional residence distinctions. The states' wide
range of independent lawmaking authority necessarily prevents
complete realization of a national free-trade unit. When the Framers provided for concurrent federal and state taxing, spending, and
regulatory powers, they sanctioned a diversity of policies among
the states. That diversity inevitably distorts business location and
resource allocation decisions from what they would be in a true
free-trade area. The Framers thus compromised to some degree the
national free-trade objectives of the commerce clause in the interest of state power. If sufficiently important to the fulfillment of
core state functions, certain distinctions based on residence might
also be justified despite their incompatibility with strict adherence
to the unification objective of the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses.
Those provisions clearly were intended to outlaw state discrimination on the basis of residence in the regulation of access to
the private sector. 148 On the other hand, the states certainly were
expected to establish public sector programs and services, and it
was much less clear that residence could not be made a necessary
qualification of participation in those. Hamilton conceded the
"justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States
could possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise
their own revenues for the supply of their own wants."'14 9 If that
"independent and uncontrollable authority" is to have real substance, it may sometimes be necessary to recognize state power to
limit publicly funded programs to residents. At a minimum, such
power should be recognized whenever requirements of equal sharing with nonresidents probably would result in no program being
created for anyone. For example, no state would be inclined to
adopt welfare programs if it could not do so without providing
benefits to poor nonresidents who simply traveled to the state periodically to collect welfare benefits. The "free-rider" problem
presented by all those who remain residents of one state, but might
visit another for the purpose of sharing in its public resources if
their temporary presence would establish their eligibility, would
surely eliminate the states' incentive to adopt assistance
148See text and notes at notes 14-18 supra.
149THE FEDEPALisT

No. 32 (Hamilton), at 197-98.
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programs. 150
The states' independent lawmaking authority suggests an even
broader range of state power to limit public sector resources to
residents. Arguably, at least in the absence of special circumstances, only the members of a group providing a service have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Like other groups free to
combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to be
shared among the group, political communities, including states,
have a prima facie justification for limiting distribution of their
public goods to those who combined to provide them.
Before using this "Lockean labor-desert theory" 151 as a presumptive justification for allocating state-created benefits to state
residents first, however, it is necessary to establish that the line
between residents and nonresidents in fact separates those who
contribute jointly to the creation of benefits from those who do
not. Establishment of state programs requires both state resources
and decisions about how to use them. It is sensible, therefore, to
examine both the class of people contributing to the state's coffers
and the class entitled to participate in the formulation of state policy to see whether the residence distinction is valid.
The state's electorate has the authority to participate, usually
through state representatives, in deciding which public goods will
be provided and in what quantities. But that nonresidents may be
denied the right to vote cannot be used to justify denying them a
right to share in most public services. Some residents also may be
denied the right to vote, but they generally may not be denied a
right to share in public programs on the same terms as their enfranchised coresidents.
An historical comparison of the status of nonresidents and
aliens residing in a state 2 is instructive in this regard. Neither of
these groups has ever been thought to have a constitutional right
150I think this is a better explanation for the validity of bona fide residency requirements as a condition to welfare than an explanation that rests on the admittedly "inexact"
"premise that indigent residents ultimately compensate the state's taxpayers much more
adequately than do indigent nonresidents," or an explanation asserting that the "classification.., is as precise as the state's rather open-ended goal permits." Simson, supra note
126, at 398.
151 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. Rxv. 1165, 1204-05 (1967).
152 I shall use the terms "aliens residing in the state" or "in-state aliens," rather than
"resident aliens." The latter term frequently is used to contrast aliens living outside the
United States with aliens residing anywhere within the nation's boundaries. The focus here
is on aliens residing in the state whose law is at issue.
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to vote, nor to participate in state policy formulation, on a par
5 At one time, however, our constitutional law
with state citizens."'
permitted more state discrimination against in-state aliens than
against nonresident citizens. The Supreme Court even said, when
discussing the equality principle of the privileges and immunities
clause, that the clause was designed to remove "the disabilities of
alienage" from state citizens when they were within states not
their own. 15 4 Well into the twentieth century, the states were permitted to deny in-state aliens the right to earn a livelihood in occupations they could not bar nonresident citizens from pursuing. 15
But the Court eventually turned the situation completely around
and began to interpret the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to limit state power to discriminate against instate aliens more severely than it has ever limited state power to
discriminate against out-of-state citizens.15 6
Today, aliens residing in a state are constitutionally entitled
to share in welfare benefits on an equal basis with other residents,1 57 though most agree that the inhabitants of other states
are not.15 8 Similarly, although the states were at one time permit-

153 With respect to nonresidents, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972).
With respect to in-state aliens, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979) ("some
state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as
to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons [including aliens] who have not
become part of the process of self-government"); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973) (declaring that a state's "power and responsibility" to preserve the basic conception
of a political community by imposing citizenship requirements "applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart
of representative government").
I" Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
255 Although the Court protected the right of aliens to earn a livelihood in the ordinary
private sector occupations of the community, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915), it
permitted the states to exclude certain aliens (largely those ineligible for naturalization)
from owning, leasing, or otherwise controlling private property devoted to farming, Frick v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197, 216-22 (1923), something the state presumably could not have done to citizens
residing in other states. See cases cited note 17 supra. See also Clarke v. Deckebach, 274
U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding a state law forbiding aliens from operating billiard parlors).
1 The first major breakthrough came in 1948, when the Court invalidated a California
law "barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship
under federal law," Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 414 (1948), and held
that the states could not "prevent lawfully admitted aliens within its borders from earning a
living in the same way that other state inhabitants earn their living," id. at 418-19.
2'7 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
158 See, e.g., Simson, supra note 126, at 397-98.

1981]

State "Citizenship"

ted to exclude their alien inhabitants from public employment,15 9
an in-state alien now has a right to the same consideration citizens
of that state receive for at least those state jobs that do not involve
the political operation of the state. 8 o But it is not thought to follow automatically from the in-state alien's entitlement to consideration for public employment that a resident of another state is
similarly entitled."1 Whether a state may constitutionally confine
public sector employment to residents, or even give residents preference over nonresidents, remains undecided.10 2
15 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
16 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-46 (1973) (invalidating a law rendering
aliens ineligible for permanent positions in the state's civil service). But see Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979) (upholding a state ban on certification as a public school
teacher of any alien who has not manifested an intention to apply for citizenship, because
public school teachers come within the "rule for governmental functions, which is an exception to the general standard applicable to classifications based on alienage"); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding exclusion of aliens from state police jobs).
''
See Simson, supra note 126, at 392 n.63.
162 The fact that constitutional doctrine now seems to provide greater protection for instate aliens than for out-of-state citizens requires rethinking of whether a state may single
out aliens who reside in other states for unfavorable treatment within its own jurisdiction.
The conventional understanding is that aliens are not included among "[tihe Citizens of
each State" who "are entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. See D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CAsE 359
(1978); 2 J. HURD, THE LAW OF FRuDOm AND BONDAGE IN THE UNrrED STATES §§ 626-632
(Boston 1862); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 46, at 380; L. TRmE, supra
note 46, § 6-33, at 411 n.18. See also Simson, supra note 126, at 380 n.10, citing Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 418, 531 n.15 (1978), as indicative of this view. In fact, the Court's point
there is quite different. Discounting the relevance to a privileges and immunities claim of
two cases, Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915), which rejected constitutional objections to a statute reserving public works jobs for
United States citizens and requiring preference to be given to the state's citizens, the Court
noted that, even if those cases "have any remaining vitality," "no out-of-state United States
citizen [had] challenged the law." As a result, those cases "were concerned almost exclusively with the statute's discrimination against resident aliens" (i.e., aliens residing in the
state). Therefore, Heim and Crane "expressed no view on [the plaintiffs'] passing Art. IV,
§ 2, privileges and immunities claim." No out-of-state alien had challenged the law either,
and the footnote reference in Hicklin therefore does not endorse the exclusion of aliens from
the protection of that clause.
The Court has never had to decide the issue of state power to discriminate against outof-state aliens, but it has assumed in dicta, both before and after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, that aliens are not protected by the interstate privileges and
immunities clause. E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 247 (1898); Paul v. Virginia,
75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419 (1857). That
assumption undoubtedly is based on the further assumption that the term "citizen," however broadly construed, does not include persons who owe their allegiance to a foreign state.
E.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 690 (1887); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162, 166 (1875) (construing the word "citizen" as used in the Constitution broadly to mean
the "membership of a nation, and nothing more," but defining membership to require political "allegiance" to the nation). See generally J. WIsE, A TREATISE ON AmERICA CrAnZNsHnp
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A comparison of the entitlements of in-state aliens and out-of3-5 (1906). It is possible, of course, to construe "citizen" more expansively, as meaning "resident, inhabitant, or person." Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 690 (1887). The word "inhabitant" was used in article IV of the Articles of Confederation, quoted in note 2 supra, and
Madison thought it a "construction scarcely avoidable" that aliens residing in other states
were thereby protected, THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Madison), at 270. Although the Constitution's fourth article substituted the word "citizen" for the word "inhabitant," Charles
Pinckney, who claimed authorship of the article, see sources cited in Simson, supra note
126, at 383 n.23 (but see W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTrrTUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 123, 164 (1977) (asserting that Pinckney was not the draftsman)),
told the Constitutional Convention that the fourth article of his plan was "formed exactly
upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confederation," except in the provision
governing the delivery of fugitives from justice. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). An argument might be made, therefore, that no
change excluding aliens from the protection of the comity clause was intended by the use of
the word "citizen."
But the argument fails, not because of Chief Justice Taney's assumption (neither supported nor refuted by historical evidence) that "this alteration in words would hardly have
been made, unless a different meaning was intended to be conveyed, or a possible doubt
removed," Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419 (1857), but because the meaning of
"citizenship" for purposes of article IV, section 2 was linked historically with the article I
grant to Congress of the power "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 4. Madison's argument in favor of delegating the power to naturalize to
Congress rested on the concern that, even if the guarantees of interstate equality were limited to persons granted citizenship status by their state of residence, one state might admit
to citizenship, and thereby provide protection in a second state for, persons who would not
have qualified for citizenship in the second state had they resided there. THE FEDERALIST
No. 42 (Madison), at 270.
This concern indicates that Madison assumed the privileges and immunities clause did
not protect aliens, and that national rather than state citizenship was the touchstone of
coverage. The language of the clause appears to make state citizenship the touchstone, however, and, until the Dred Scott case, debate raged on the issues of whether free blacks were
citizens for purposes of article IV and whether it was state or national citizenship that
counted. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra, at 64-73; W. WIECEK, supra, at 123, 139-41, 162-67. The
Court held that national citizenship was required to invoke the privileges and immunities
clause. In concluding that the Framers' bestowal of the power of naturalization on Congress
at the same time they adopted the privileges and immunities clause indicated that "[n]o
State was willing to permit another State to determine who should or should not be admitted as one of its citizens, and entitled to demand equal rights and privileges with their own
people, within their own territories," 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417, Chief Justice Taney was
following in the footsteps of Madison and Joseph Story, see 2 J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTrrUTION §§ 1805-1806 (5th ed. 1891). Accord, J. HURD, supra, § 632. But see D.
FEaRENBACHER, supra, at 344-46.
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, which overruled Dred Scott by making "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof... citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside," U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, the distinction between state and national citizenship is of greatly reduced
importance, as state citizenship generally derives from national citizenship with the addition
of residence. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-74 (1873). For purposes of article IV, section 2, the distinction could only matter where a United States citizen
had not yet established bona fide residence in a state or where an alien is nonetheless a state
citizen. (The states are free to extend the grant of state citizenship to aliens, at least for
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state residents shows that two groups equally ineligible for participation in state decision making have been thought to have different claims to the state's public resources. The disenfranchised resident currently is thought to have a greater claim than the
disenfranchised nonresident. Significantly, one of the reasons often
given for the in-state alien's entitlement is that he is subject to
state taxation. 163 We come, then, to the question of whether the
comparative tax (and other) obligations of residents and nonresidents justify the use of residence distinctions in the allocation of
state-funded public resources.
Here the underlying constitutional assumptions of our federal
structure support state power to favor residents. State authority
governs only within the state's fixed territorial boundaries. As a
result, a state may tax and regulate residents based on the fact of
residence within the state, while nonresidents as a class are immune.'" Only those nonresidents who engage in taxable activity
internal purposes. E.g., Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 243 Md. 555, 221 A.2d
431 (1966) (holding an alien a state citizen eligible to hold the office of sheriff).) Whether a
state can freely discriminate against out-of-state aliens whose states of residence nonetheless consider them state citizens is thus still an open question.
But it probably need not be decided. Wholly aside from whether it is national or state
citizenship-or both-that matters for purposes of article IV, iection 2, and even if one
accepts the assumption that no alien may claim the protection of the clause, aliens' current
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection should render their exclusion from the
coverage of the comity clause meaningless. Out-of-state aliens might be singled out for unfavorable treatment in two cases-where article IV, section 2 would prohibit discrimination
against out-of-state citizens, and where a state may constitutionally disfavor all nonresidents but chooses only to disfavor out-of-state aliens. In either case the state is relying on
the status of alienage, not nonresidence, to justify the discrimination. The out-of-state alien
can claim justifiably that he is worse off than the out-of-state citizen, and that the line
drawn between his class and the class of out-of-state citizens is an invidious classification
violating equal protection. The out-of-state alien, like the in-state alien, is part of a politically powerless group historically subjected to discrimination, "a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Even where the Court has been less solicitous of discrimination against aliens, see notes 153, 160 supra, it is because of perceived
attributes of nonmembership in the political community of the state. In this regard, out-ofstate citizens and out-of-state aliens stand on the same footing. Thus the equal protection
clause requires that out-of-state aliens be treated on a par with out-of-state citizens. This
makes the exclusion of aliens from the protection of article IV, section 2, of no practical

significance.
243 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) ("Aliens like citizens pay taxes
and may be called into the armed forces.... There can be no 'special public interest' in
tax revenues to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the
State.").
16 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937); see J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 46, at 313-15, 316-17; Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce- "DirectBurdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAN. L. REv.
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within the state are subject to the state's taxing power.16 5 Even as
between residents and the subclass of nonresidents who enter the
state, the nonresidents are immunized from obligations that can be
imposed on residents. Residents may be taxed on income wherever
earned," 6 whereas nonresidents may be taxed only on income
earned within the state. 67 In addition, although a state is constitutionally free to tax residents for in-state activity without having to
impose the same or any tax on nonresidents engaged in the same
6 8 the opposite is not true. Nonresidents,
in-state activity,"
by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause, and nonresident business, by virtue of the commerce clause,16 may not be taxed on instate activity unless residents or resident business are subject to at
least equal taxation. 17 The vulnerabilities of residents and the immunities of nonresidents together support the use of residence
classifications as a proxy for determining who provided the resources to create the state's public goods.
To be sure, the correlation between residency and those who
contribute to state revenues is not perfect. The states can and do
levy taxes on nonresidents engaged in business within the state
and on in-state sales to nonresidents;' 7 ' they charge nonresidents
who utilize state services or purchase state goods; and some states
receive indirect contributions from taxes nonresidents pay to the
federal government, which are then redistributed among the states
through federal spending programs. Indeed, if a state taxes residents at redistributive levels, it may tax nonresidents engaged in
the same activity at those levels, 72 so that it is not even true that
496, 502-03 (1951).
165 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
2" E.g., Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932). See also sources cited

note 164 supra.
167 See Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1309, 1312, 1318-19 (1974).
16 E.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
165 Because most interstate business is conducted in corporate form, and corporations
are not "citizens" within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, see note 47
supra, nonresident businesses normally will invoke the commerce clause.
170With regard to the privileges and immunities clause, see Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656 (1975); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). As to the commerce clause, see, e.g., Hale v. Bimco
Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939); I.M. Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113
(1908); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
"I See generally L. TRmE, supra note 46, §§ 6-14 to -19.
171 See Hellerstein, supra note 167, at 1322 & n.73. Professor Hellerstein's article provides a good discussion of the separate, and harder, question of whether a state may calculate the rate at which a nonresident's in-state income should be taxed by including income
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nonresidents can be made to pay only for their share of the state
services they use. Finally, there may be many residents who do not
contribute any taxes to the state treasury, and many others who
contribute less than some nonresidents.
These imperfections, however, do not destroy the general validity of using residence to approximate the group responsible for
creating the state's benefits. Residents may be compelled to contribute; if some are not taxed, it is only because they cannot pay,
or because the representatives of the resident group have decided
to grant them an exemption. By contrast, nonresidents as such are
entirely immune from compulsory exaction. It is only taxable activity in the state that permits the state to impose a levy. Moreover, that some nonresidents may contribute to the state treasury
at most supports an argument that those nonresidents who have
paid in more than they have received back may claim a share of
other state resources. It will not support a general claim of entitlement to state-funded benefits by nonresidents. Theoretically, a
court might allow a nonresident to prove that his contributions to
the state's coffers exceeded the costs of state services rendered to
him and then either reduce his tax bill or grant him a right to
share in the other state programs he has been forced to support.
The courts thus far have been unreceptive to this sort of individual
accounting, 17 8 however, no doubt because of the difficulty of assigning prices to the often intangible state benefits received by the
nonresident taxpayer. In the absence of such individualization, it is
appropriate to treat residents as the group funding those services
that nonresident taxpayers do not inherently use in their in-state
activity. 17 ' Again, that some nonresidents may pay taxes is no reason to require the state to treat all nonresidents on a par with residents. In sum, when a state uses state revenues to create public
goods and services, it has a prima facie justification for allocating
those resources to state residents (either preferentially or exclu-

earned outside the state. The point here is that even if the state determines the tax rate by
looking to in-state activity only, that rate may be a redistributive rate in the sense that the
nonresident taxpayer pays more in taxes than he receives in state benefits (as long as residents are equally taxed).
173E.g., American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1969);
Stephan v. State Tax Comm'n, 245 A.2d 552 (Del. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 573 (1969).
174 Nonresident taxpayers do, of course, receive the benefits of those public goods (like
a climate of law and order) from which they cannot feasibly be excluded, see M. OLsoN, Tim
LOGIC oF COLLECTIVE AcTiON 14-15, 36-43 (1965), as well as benefits from which they cannot
legally be excluded, like highways.
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sively), simply because residents as a class175combined to establish
them, and nonresidents as a class did not.
C.

The Limits of Resident Preference in the Public Sector

That the states can assert a strong claim to limit state-funded
programs to residents should not mean that nonresident claims of
access to these programs must always yield, regardless of the circumstances. Because state power to discriminate against nonresidents, even in the state's public sector, is at odds with the constitutional goals of national unification and an open economy, it is
necessary to decide whether the objectives of interstate equality or
the purposes of state government shall prevail in any particular
context. Special circumstances may argue in favor of nonresident
access to certain state-established services.
The appeal of a nonresident claim of access to state-created
benefits is likely to vary in accordance with both the extent of the
burden imposed on the state if nonresidents must be served and
175 This affirmative case for state freedom to favor residents in the disposition of statecreated benefits precludes equating issues of resident preference in the public sector with
those arising when the states impose resident preference requirements on the private sector.
Professor (now Justice) Linde, one of the first to pay serious attention to these problems,
sought to minimize the differences between public and private sector resident preference by
emphasizing that, particularly in the welfare state, nonresidents lose similar, and significant,
economic and personal opportunities whichever sector the state biases towards residents.
Linde, ConstitutionalRights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REV. 10, 49-67 (1965). Moreover, he found little reason to draw a
distinction allowing Balkanization whenever a state chooses to socialize "the intended
means of its economic protectionism." Id. at 59.
On the other hand, Professor Linde acknowledged that the distinction "between state
regulation of the private and state operation of the public sector. . . does remain relevant
to the state's use of its fiscal resources," and he conceded that "in the selective use of direct
subsidy. . . the states perhaps retain some means immune from constitutional attack to let
charity, and economic self-help, begin and end at home." Id. at 64. Although a multitude of
resident preferences in the states' public sectors could fit comfortably within this concession, Professor Linde apparently did not intend to open the door very wide. See id. at 66-67.
But the affirmative claims of state fiscal autonomy, which rest on valid residence distinctions, cannot be shut out so easily.
As for the incentive to socialism that the distinction creates, it seems unlikely in our
society that the desire to be protectionist often will outweigh disincentives. More fundamentally, the states should possess significant freedom to enlarge their public sectors if they
wish, and as a practical matter that freedom is restricted if residence distinctions cannot be
drawn. The Constitution limits state suppression of the private sector, but it also contemplates public sectors of varying designs in different states and thereby precludes a fully open
economy. The conflict is inherent in the system, and eliminating the incentive to socialize
can be accomplished only by ignoring the constitutional significance of separate state political communities.
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the extent of the burden on nonresidents if access is denied. The
less nonresident access interferes with state ability to serve residents, or the greater the harm that would be inflicted on the nonresident by denying access, the stronger the nonresident claim will
be. 7 6 What follows is an attempt to flesh out these general guide-

lines and to assess to what degree the specific factors isolated do,
in fact, weigh in favor of the nonresident claim.
1. The "Abundant" State Resource. A strong argument can
be mounted that one should refuse to acknowledge state power to
prefer residents in allocating state-funded opportunities when the
nonresident offers to pay the state's full cost of providing the benefit, and when providing it will not prevent a resident from obtaining the benefit. It is one thing to say that when the state's supply is not large enough to satisfy the needs of both residents and
nonresidents, the state should be able to prefer those largely responsible for the availability of whatever supply there is. It is quite
another to say that if both can be supplied, and the nonresident
offers to pay the full cost of the item, denying the nonresident's
offer is justified. Discrimination on the basis of residence in the
latter case would be gratuitous. In fact, the distinction would be so
arbitrary as to violate even the minimum rationality standard of
177
equal protection.
In Doe v. Bolton,17 the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia

residence requirement imposed as a condition of eligibility for either private or public medical care for abortion patients. The denial of access to private sector benefits within the state alone sufficiently justified the Court's holding that the privileges and
immunities clause was violated. But while the Court interpreted
the ban on both private and public care as not indicating "any policy of preserving state-supported facilities for Georgia residents,"
it also said "[t]here is no intimation, either, that Georgia facilities
are utilized to capacity in caring for Georgia residents.' 17

The pos-

sible implication is that even if the ban had been narrowed to ex176 The objective of national unification is threatened not only by nonresident resentment of exclusion from a state's benefits, but also by resident resentment of being forced to
share state resources with nonresidents. The extent of the respective burdens thus affects
the balance from two perspectives simultaneously.
177 Even when a residence classification is immune from review under the privileges and
immunities clause, the equal protection clause nonetheless applies. Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388-91 (1978).
.78 410 U.S 179 (1973).
17'

Id. at 200.
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cluding nonresidents only from public hospitals, nonresident access
would have been required anyway as long as the hospitals were not
filled to capacity.
Unfortunately, a state-provided service that is not limited in
supply exists only hypothetically. Money is always a scarce resource for government. If the state could not be sure of recouping
from the nonresident all costs of supply, but was required to serve
nonresidents, it might well adopt the alternative of not providing
the service to anyone and saving the money for another use. This
provides a nonarbitrary reason for denying nonresident access.
Furthermore, even if the state could recoup the full financial cost,
other, nonfinancial costs of extending state services to nonresidents
could make the denial of nonresident access rational. Take the case
of the public hospital, for example. The nonresident offering to pay
the full costs of care appears to have a strong claim to access when
there is an excess of beds over current resident demand. The state
might nonetheless rationally argue that it is justified in denying
nonresident access either because it wishes to reserve excess capacity for emergencies, or because it wants to provide the best possible care to its residents, and the more crowded the hospital is, the
lower the quality of care. Similarly, one could say that total exclusion of nonresidents from state highways is unjustified because
there is enough room available to serve both residents and nonresidents. But increases in traffic can impose nonfinancial costs that
the state might reasonably want to avoid, so that nonresident access would require spending more state resources to provide more
highways.
Despite the inaccuracy of positing a state resource so abundant that allowing nonresident access would not limit state flexibility to service residents, however, there is a natural inclination
to think in terms of immediate availability and thus to accord
greater weight to the claim of the nonresident seeking nonexclusive
access to state services than to the nonresident's claim to a state
resource that is available only for one individual's use.18 0 The nonresident's claim for the last public hospital bed at a time when
demand exceeds supply has less appeal than a similar claim made
when beds are available and the state's reason for denying access is
180 Cf. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (finding it easier to uphold

federal court injunction insofar as it prohibited a city from allowing segregated private
schools and affiliated groups exclusive access to public recreational facilities than insofar as
it barred the city from granting such groups nonexclusive access to the same facilities).
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to improve the staff-patient ratio. Whenever the supply of a public
good seems ample enough to satisfy both resident and nonresident
demand, the nonresident claim of access will seem strong. Before
approving nonresident exclusion in such a case, the state should at
least be required to come forward with an explanation of why nonresident purchase of a seemingly abundant public service would
frustrate a deliberate state policy. If the state does so, the "abundance" may turn out to be more apparent than real. If it does not,
the discrimination should be found unjustified and invalid. Evaluation of the nonresident's claim of abundance will depend, therefore, not only on just how abundant the state's resource is, but on
the state's true reasons for denying nonresident access. In short,
relative abundance of the public sector resource may lead to favoring nonresident access; how strongly, if at all, will depend on a
thorough examination of the reasons for the state resident
preference.
2. The Nonresident's Need for the State-Created Resource.
A state's presumptive right to exclude nonresidents from statefunded services should also be rebuttable when the effect of exclusion on nonresident opportunity is unusually severe. At some
point, the effect of nonresident access on the state's fiscal autonomy will pale beside the effect of state discrimination against nonresidents on the national unification, free-trade, and nationwide
individual opportunity objectives of the Constitution's interstate
equality provisions. When that point is reached, the states' legitimate claim to serve their own residents must give way to the more
important claim of national solidarity and opportunity.
Knowing when that point is reached requires an assessment of
the importance to the nonresident of access to the state-provided
program in question. That requires, in turn, an assessment of the
intrinsic importance of the benefit sought, its importance as a
means of assuring the nonresident access to other opportunities
within the state to which he is clearly entitled, and the extent to
which the benefit is unavailable from other sources because the
state has a monopoly. The overall strength of any nonresident
claim will depend on the combined strength of each element. Inevitably, individual judgments of importance and availability will differ, as will individual judgments of how strong the nonresident's
claim must be before the otherwise justified favoritism towards
residents must yield. Nevertheless, it is desirable to explain these
factors as fully as possible.
The inquiry to be pursued here, with its focus on the impor-
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tance of nonresident access to state-funded programs, may appear
to be much like the fundamentality doctrine in the Supreme
Court's privileges and immunities clause jurisprudence, a doctrine
criticized earlier in this article."" But the point actually is different. The fundamentality doctrine requires the nonresident to show
that the in-state opportunity sought, whether state-created or not,
is "basic to the maintenance or well-being of the union" before the
clause even applies. 82 The point here is that the state always must
justify residence discrimination. Even when the state has a prima
facie justification for favoring residents because the nonresident
seeks access to state-financed opportunities, the nonresident may
nonetheless overcome that justification if the opportunity denied is
sufficiently important. Moreover, the fundamentality doctrine appears to concentrate on the importance of the opportunity alone,
without taking into account whether it is uniquely available within
the state. 183 The purpose, effects, and scope of operation of the
fundamentality doctrine are thus radically different from those of
.the present inquiry.
a. The intrinsic importance of the state-created benefit. All
other things being equal, the strength of the nonresidenl's claim to
access will vary with the significance of the opportunity sought.
The nonresident's claim to emergency medical, police, and fire protection services within the state surely stands on a different plane
than a claim of access to public golf and tennis facilities, or to public education or employment, even assuming the equal existence or
nonexistence of in-state alternatives in each case. With the possible exception of emergency services, the inherent significance of
the state benefit alone probably will not overcome the state's justification for resident preference. That is particularly true where the
choice will be between serving only residents and not serving anyone at all, or where the service will be readily available from other
sources. In the first case, forcing the state to serve nonresidents
results in depriving residents of the service. The importance of the
interest could actually cut against the nonresident claim here. In
the second case, although the service or benefit itself may be important to nonresidents, having the state provide it is not, because
alternate sources of supply exist. But, although the intrinsic importance of the benefit usually is not a strong factor by itself, it is
181See text and notes at notes 88-118 supra.
182 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
183 See id. at 374-76 (opinion of the Court); id. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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relevant to evaluating the overall weight to be given the nonresident's claim.
b. The ancillary state benefit needed to provide nonresident
access to opportunities whose availability is guaranteed. Some
public services may be important to nonresidents in order to ensure equality of access with residents to other public or private sector opportunities whose availability to nonresidents is guaranteed.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court zealously enforces the rights
of nonresidents and nonresident business to equal access to the
private sector. 18 4 Those rights would not be meaningful if statefunded programs necessary to private sector access could exclude
nonresidents. For example, if state roads could be closed to all but
residents, or if state-owned public utilities could limit in-state customer service to state residents, then nonresident freedom to trade
or deal with residents, or to live in one state and operate a business
in another, or even to pass through one state to get to another,
would be drastically curtailed. Although state revenues may be responsible for the existence of the roads or utility services, state
fiscal autonomy cannot justify such severe collateral effects of nonresident exclusion.
That a public resource is ancillary to nonresident enjoyment
of constitutionally guaranteed opportunities, however, does not automatically override state authority to favor residents. Here again,
whether the state has the ability to serve both residents and nonresidents is relevant, as is whether the nonresident can find the
needed resource elsewhere.
But one might sensibly require less of a showing of abundance
or state monopoly to uphold a right of nonresident access if the
benefit in question is of intrinsic or ancillary importance, or both,
than if it is neither. Thus, nonresidents should be guaranteed instate police and fire protection and general access to state
courts, 8 5 even though these services are funded from the state's
See text and notes at notes 14-18 supra.
The best discussion of the privileges and immunities clause with respect to nonresident access to state courts is Currie & Schreter, supra note 9, at 1379-89, reprinted in B.
CuRR, supra note 9, at 511-23. See also Simson, supra note 126, at 398-99. Professor Currie was critical of Justice Holmes's statement in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279
U.S. 377, 387 (1929), that "[t]here are manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to
often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is
they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned." In response, Currie pointed to highways and police protection, and asserted, in agreement with the conclusions reached in this
article, that "the fact that local residents or citizens primarily bear the cost of local facilities
does not of itself justify refusal of their use to citizens of other states." Currie & Schreter,
"s
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general revenues, and even though it may be possible to secure
substitutes, because these services are integral to the enjoyment,
on the same terms as residents, of other in-state opportunities
open to nonresidents. Under those circumstances, the interstate
equality claim should supersede the claim of state freedom to confine state spending for the benefit of residents.
c. The state-created benefit unavailable elsewhere: the
equality obligations of monopoly power. Any assessment of the
impact of state resident preference policies on nonresident opportunity would be incomplete without consideration of whether, and
to what extent, the benefit the state wants to deny the nonresident
could possibly be obtained from another source. When the nonresident's alternatives are limited or nonexistent, the severity of exclusion from the state's program should weigh heavily, and often dispositively, in favor of the nonresident's claim of access.
The argument that a lawful monopolist should have less freedom than others to discriminate in selecting those with whom to
deal has been accepted in a number of nonconstitutional business
contexts. Thus, when the states choose to treat private utilities
with natural monopolies as regulated industries, they typically require them to refrain from discrimination in customer selection. 186
At common law, businesses clothed with a public interest were
subject to similar duties of nondiscrimination.8 7 Under federal antitrust law, rules of nondiscriminatory access have even been imposed on business firms that undertake lawful concerted activity to
develop facilities that amount to natural monopolies.1 88
The analogy between state refusals to make state-created re-

supra note 9, at 1380, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 511-12. He deemed it a
truth that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a state to open the doors of
its courts to citizens of other states who assert claims against local residents and citizens, even on causes of action predicated upon the law of another state, if it would
allow its own citizens to assert such a cause of action.
Id. at 1384, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 516. Nonetheless, Currie also considered "the constitutionality of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. . . firmly established,"
id., and he agreed that a state should be able to turn away litigation when none of the
parties is a resident, because in doing so the state is respecting another state's greater inter-

est in the litigation and is preventing the use of its own courts for purposes of harassment,
id. at 1384-85, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 515-16. I do not mean to question
the validity of the forum non conveniens doctrine either.
186 See W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 288 (2d ed. 1976).
187

18

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 762-765 (1939).
See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v.

United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 48 (1977).
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sources available to nonresidents and biased customer selection
policies of private businesses is certainly not perfect. The legitimate purposes of private enterprise are more limited than those of
the states, and it is therefore more likely that discriminatory refusals to deal by private organizations will reflect arbitrary, anticompetitive, or retaliatory motives than it is that state refusal to deal
with nonresidents will do so. The analogy may be closer when the
state resource in question is the product of a state business enterprise, but even then the state's purpose, unlike that of private
business, usually is not exclusively to make a profit. Moreover, the
private business does not have the state's presumptive justification
for refusing to make state-created benefits available to
nonresidents.
On the other hand, although the state's reason for discriminating against nonresidents may seem less blameworthy than the motive for a similar decision by a private firm, the effect on the excluded party is as severe when the state is a monopolist as when a
private organization is. It is the possession of monopoly power that
transforms the private firm that is free to discriminate into a firm
that is subject to a duty of providing nondiscriminatory access. In
large part, the reason is that discriminatory exclusion would leave
the excluded party without recourse and would unduly limit opportunities. Preventing state limitation of nonresident opportunity
is, of course, a prime objective of the commerce and privileges and
immunities clauses, and when the state is in a monopoly position
its power to disadvantage nonresidents relative to residents can be
overwhelming. The combination of the Constitution's special concern for nonresidents as a class and the widespread, traditional
public policy against discriminatory distribution of monopolized
benefits therefore tends to support a principle forbidding state residence discrimination in the distribution of state-monopolized
resources.
Even if one accepts this general rule, however, there is ample
room for debate about what level of monopoly power should trigger
the equality obligation. That level will vary, of course, depending
on the abundance, and the intrinsic or ancillary importance, of the
state resource.189 But some inquiry into just how foreclosed the
189Thus, even if the state does not have a complete monopoly of police and fire protection services within the state, or of the judicial resolution of nonresident disputes with residents, the importance of these services, together with the degree of monopoly power possessed by the state, argues strongly in favor of an equality obligation. See text and note at
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nonresident's alternatives are is also a central feature of the
calculus. Measurement of monopoly power requires some sensitivity to geographic and product markets, as well as to the monopolist's market share.19 0 In short, it is necessary to determine the
amount of monopoly power present in a particular instance as well
as the amount necessary to impose the obligation of equality. In
the context of state resource monopolies, these factors suggest a
number of relevant issues. When considering the nonresident's alternatives, should the availability of the resource in the nonresident's home state matter, or only the availability in the private
sector of the state wishing to deny him access to the public resource? What resources similar in function to the resource sought
should be considered acceptable substitutes for the purpose of
measuring availability? Does it matter whether no realistic alternative is possible, as in the case of natural monopolies, or whether
other sources are possible but presently unavailable?
Some examples will demonstrate the relevance of these questions. First, consider the most extreme case, where the state has a
complete monopoly and for legal or practical reasons no other
source of supply is feasible. The state highway, built and maintained with state funds, is perhaps the most obvious resource that
the private sector will not duplicate. The public utility owned and
operated by the state is another natural monopoly that effectively
precludes private sector competition. In both cases, the nonresident must have access to the state-created service if there is to be
any in-state access at all. The geographic market must be confined
to the state if there is to be any access to in-state opportunities
that must be available to nonresidents; no reasonable substitutes
for the state service are available. The case for nonresident access
is at its strongest.
The nonresident's case for a right to use state-operated transportation systems arguably is weaker. Even if the state has a natural or legal monopoly on bus or rail service, the availability of private motor vehicle transportation may weaken the nonresident's
claim. That would be true only if one considered the alternative an
adequate substitute; given the importance of transportation, this
seems doubtful. But the point is that product definition may have
some bearing on whether the state's exclusion of nonresidents
should be permitted. If private and public bus companies freely
note 185 supra.
190 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 188, §§ 12-32.
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competed over the same routes at reasonable intervals, the nonresident claim would certainly be weakened due to the decrease in the
state's monopoly power.
There also are strong elements of state monopoly in the provision of police and fire protection within the state. The existence of
private counterparts to public police and fire departments arguably leaves the nonresident free to look elsewhere for in-state protection, at least if he is wealthy enough; but the importance of
these services, together with the infeasibility of private alternatives, should suffice to establish his entitlement to receive them
from the state.
In each of the preceding examples, the availability of the desired benefit in the nonresident's home state is irrelevant. That the
nonresident is entitled to use the highways, utility service, public
transportation, or police and fire protection within his home state
is no help to him while he is elsewhere. There are other cases, however, where home state availability does appear to be relevant. It
could be argued that the relevant geographical focus should always
be the state wishing to deny state-created resources to the nonresident, because the point of the constitutional guarantees of interstate equality is to provide protection for the resident of one state
in every other state. But once the premise that the state is presumptively justified in using state revenues for the benefit of residents alone is accepted, it seems sensible that, although that justification can be overridden by a claim of exceptional nonresident
need, all sources potentially available to alleviate that need should
be considered, including those available in the nonresident's home
state.191 An assessment of the adequacy of the home-state alternative will, of course, be required, and the fact of distance may often
make the alternative inadequate. But the alternative may sometimes be viable. For example, suppose a state has only public hospitals or state-operated liquor stores. If a nonresident seeks nonemergency medical care or attempts to purchase liquor, should the
in-state monopoly establish his right to be served even though similar care and commodities are available in his home state? Cer"' Available sources in third states may also be relevant. One must be careful to include only such states as are realistically accessible to the nonresident, or in other words,
only those within the relevant geographic market. Moreover, it is problematic whether one
state's right to exclude nonresidents from state-created benefits should be built upon another state's willingness to include nonresidents, because the other state may decide to
claim a similar right of nonresident exclusion. The nonresident's home state by definition is
unable to exclude him from state benefits on that basis.
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tainly the nonresident's claim is stronger if there is no private instate alternative, just as it is if there is no home-state alternative,
although in any given case other factors may make the state fiscal
autonomy claim strong enough to prevail.' 92 The state's creation of
unique resources imposes greater equality obligations than its creation of resources also found in other states.
Application of the principle that monopoly power often carries
with it duties of nondiscriminatory access requires careful individualized evaluation in each case. Many of the difficulties that plague
antitrust law will be equally troublesome in this context as well.
But if it is important enough to make the inquiry to reach appropriate results in the field of antitrust, it is also important enough
in the enforcement of the commerce and privileges and immunities
clauses.
III.

UNCONDITIONAL ALLOCATIONS OF STATE RESOURCES

Bearing in mind the basic approach developed in Part II to
delineate the contours of state power to favor residents over nonresidents, the next two parts of the article evaluate the constitutional validity of residence discrimination in the distribution of a
wide range of state-owned resources. Two different forms of state
resident preference will be addressed. The first, the subject of this
part, is when the state gives its residents exclusive or preferred access to state resources without exacting any promises from those
who deal with the state to implement other resident preferences.
Accordingly, this part centers on the two-party relationship between the state and those with whom it will deal directly and unconditionally. In the next part, preference schemes that condition
eligibility to participate in public programs on the recipient's willingness to favor residents in independent transactions will be
considered.
A.

The Expenditure of State Funds

When the states spend money directly on private parties, either through subsidies or through payments for goods or services,
they would appear to have the strongest justification for preferring
192

Assuming an in-state monopoly and home-state availability in both examples, the

greater importance of access to even nonemergency medical care than of access to alcoholic
beverages may well limit state power to exclude nonresidents in the former case, but not in
the latter.
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residents as the recipients of those funds. The collection of state
revenues to serve state residents is at the core of the purposes of
state political organization, and money is the paradigmatic
fungible resource that is not monopolized by one or a limited number of states. Moreover, monetary resources are finite; making
funds available for one purpose, or for one group,, makes them
unavailable for use by another.
Nonetheless, because of the inherent tension between the
goals of interstate equality and the basic assumptions of the states
as separate political communities, some state spending schemes
that favor residents have been thought more troublesome than
others. I have already indicited that inability to limit eligibility for
state subsidy programs to residents often would eliminate the
state's freedom to choose whether to have subsidy programs or
not.19 3 Whether this is undesirable in the special context of subsidies to resident business, however, as it so clearly is in the context
of welfare assistance, remains to be considered. After that issue is
examined, the remainder of this section deals with the general
problem of state purchases of goods and services, and then with
the question of state employment.
1. State Subsidies to Private Business. If a state provides local industry with financial subsidies to improve its interstate competitive position, or to induce out-of-state businesses to relocate
within the state, does the subsidizing state's preference for resident business violate the antidiscrimination core of the commerce
clause? Before that question can be answered, it must be refined
by taking account of the nature of the subsidy and its relationship
to the comparative tax obligations of resident and nonresident business. The issue is best framed by asking whether a state is free to
grant direct subsidies to in-state business only, assuming the state
does not tax the in-state activity or income of either resident or
193 See text at note 150 supra. Not all financial assistance programs present "freerider" problems. California, for example, provides assistance to residents injured as victims
of crime, but does not pay nonresidents who are victimized while in the state. It seems
unlikely that requiring California to treat persons criminally injured in the state without
residence distinctions would lead to any influx of crime victims. Nonetheless, the restriction
of assistance to residents follows readily from the fiscal autonomy interests of the state. The
program's restriction was recently upheld over the objection of a nonresident shot on vacation in San Francisco, Ostrager v. State Bd. of Control, 99 Cal. App. 3d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 317
(Ct. App. 1979), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 53 (1980), although on the less satisfactory
ground that the privileges and immunities clause did not apply because, following Baldwin,
"receiving compensation as a crime victim from the state in which the crime occurred is
[not] a basic right." Id. at 6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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nonresident business. The qualification is necessary, because it is
clear that the states are forbidden to tax out-of-state businesses
more heavily than in-state businesses, 194 that they may therefore
not allow resident businesses tax deductions or exemptions unavailable to nonresident businesses, 195 and that the same impermissible result would be produced if resident and nonresident
businesses were equally taxed but only resident businesses received
cash subsidy rebates.
The issue is not whether a state that does not tax nonresident
business, but generally does tax resident business, may give tax
breaks or cash subsidies to selected resident industries. In that situation, the state is doing no more than lowering its tax rate for
some in-state businesses relative to others. Its action does not directly disadvantage out-of-state businesses. Although the favored
industry may now be relatively better off than competitiors in
other states with higher tax rates, this is an implicitly sanctioned
consequence of allowing each state to choose independently
whether and at what rates to impose taxes. As noted previously, e
the states' independent taxing authority necessarily departs from
the ideal of a true free-trade area, but that departure is an underlying assumption of our federal structure.
The question here is whether the implicit assumptions of federalism also sanction direct subsidies to local business that, although they do not mask discriminatory taxation of foreign businesses, do more than lower the taxes of resident business.97 The
subsidy issue frequently is posed in connection with Justice Cardozo's opinions in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig 98 and Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co.199 In Baldwin, the Supreme Court held that a
state could not insulate in-state milk producers from out-of-state
competition by establishing a minimum price that in-state retailers
had to pay their suppliers, wherever situated. In Silas Mason, the
Court allowed a state that imposed a domestic sales tax to impose
See text and notes at notes 169-170 supra.
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
1" See text following note 147 supra.
197 The distinction is between businesses domiciled in the state and businesses domiciled elsewhere. If a state denied eligibility for a subsidy to businesses domiciled in the
state, but owned by the residents of other states, a different issue would be presented. Given
the obligations of such businesses to the state, subsidy discrimination among resident businesses on account of the residence of their owners should not be permitted.
'9
294 U.S. 511 (1935).
-99 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
'9

193 See
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a compensating use tax in the same amount on goods purchased in
other states but used in the taxing state. The cases are reconcilable. The minimum price scheme entirely wiped out the competitive
price advantage previously enjoyed by out-of-state producers as a
result of their greater efficiency. The use tax, on the other hand,
only eliminated a competitive advantage enjoyed by nonresident
sellers as a result of the taxing state's sales tax, which necessarily
(although certainly not intentionally) placed resident sellers at a
competitive disadvantage relative to nonresident sellers domiciled
in states with no or lower sales taxes. Under this commonly held
view, 200 the commerce clause is not a barrier to all state laws that
affect the flow of commerce towards local, and away from out-ofstate, business-for the constitutionally permissible use tax was
expressly designed to keep domestic purchasers from buying where
lower tax burdens caused overall prices to be cheaper. Instead, as
Justice Cardozo put it in Baldwin, the commerce clause precludes
state efforts "designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the
place of origin. 2 01 In Silas Mason, the advantage that nonresident
sellers possessed because of the sales tax did not belong to the
place of origin of their goods. It was, rather, attributable to the
taxing state. Thus, Cardozo could say of the use tax that "equality
' 20 2
and not preference is the end to be achieved.
Ernest Brown objected to Cardozo's analysis on the ground
that the relevant issue was "not preference, but protection, 2 0 3 implying that protection of local merchants with the effect of limiting
resident consumer access to cheaper out-of-state goods was well
within the concerns of the commerce clause. What, then, of subsidies to local business only? To turn Professor Brown's phrase
around a bit, they are not only protection-they are also preference. Their objective is to protect local industry against the forces
of the interstate market by nullification of competitive advantages
available elsewhere. The method of accomplishing that objective is
to prefer business domiciled in the state in the allocation of state
funds. Unlike the tax in Silas Mason, the direct subsidy seeks to
do more than offset the competitive disadvantages to resident business arising from local tax burdens. It seeks to reduce the competitive edge possessed by out-of-state business whether derived from
OOSee

L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 6-16, at 359.

11 294 U.S. at 527 (emphasis added).
:2

300 U.S. at 586.

"01Brown, supra note 4, at 235.
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lower tax rates, productive efficiency, or anything else. The result
of an effective local subsidy program will be the same as that of a
tax or minimum pricing scheme-to distort the competitive interstate market and thereby alter consumption patterns. The longterm effects are likely to be incompatible with nationwide economic efficiency.
These considerations argue strongly against the constitutionality of direct subsidies. But there are substantial arguments on the
other side. First, unlike the tax or price regulation that dulls the
competitive edge of out-of-state business by raising the price of its
products to resident consumers, the subsidy diverts trade fo businesses domiciled in the subsidizing state by allowing them to lower
their prices. The effect on out-of-state businesses may be similar,
but, at least in the short run, subsidies do not threaten-and may
even enhance-consumer access to cheaper goods in the interstate
market, thereby alleviating one of Professor Brown's concerns
about Silas Mason.2 0 4
Second, following the distinction between Baldwin and Silas
Mason and the theory advanced in this article, it may be said that
the competitive advantages lost to producers in State B by virtue
of a subsidy to domestic producers given by State A do not belong
to State B, the "state of origin," but rather to State A. Just as
State B's producers may not complain under the commerce clause
of private productivity gains in State A that make State A producers more competitive, so the subsidy may be taken as another one
of the permissible conditions that give State A whatever competitive advantages it affords. To be sure, a state that discriminates
against out-of-state goods through tax or price regulation mechanisms harms not only nonresident merchants, but also the state's
own consumers, who lose access to cheaper goods. But the subsidy
is only different in that it burdens the state's taxpayers, or those
residents who would benefit from alternative uses of state funds, or
some of both, instead of the state's consumers, as it harms the
nonresident merchant. In light of the overlap between these
groups, the distinction may seem insubstantial. But to strike down
a state expenditure of funds collected for the primary purpose of
See id. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 6-10, at 337:
Ordinarily ... concern with adverse impacts on competitors has not been muted
by any principle that, unless harm to consumers is demonstrable, an open economy
need not be maintained. On the contrary, the assumption has been, and continues to
be, that producers no less than consumers may claim the protection of the implied
restraints of the commerce clause.

204
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serving residents, just because the immediate objective of the expenditure is to attract industry, employment, and commercial
prosperity to, or to keep it in, the subsidizing state, would be to
interfere with the state's disposition of nonmonopolized public resources-an interest that is not implicated when a discriminatory
tax or artificial price regulation is applied to out-of-state goods. 205
Just as the states are permitted to adjust the level of nondiscriminatory tax they impose on in-state business activity, even if
the purpose of the adjustment is to help local business compete in
interstate commerce, 206 so may they claim a right to establish internal spending policies to accomplish the same objective. In the
case of either taxing or spending policy, independent state decision-making authority necessarily deviates from the ideal of a freetrade unit. But the American federal structure assumes that there
is a difference between a state modifying the burdens or benefits
distributed among its own residents and a state setting discriminatory terms on which those outside the state, over whom it has no
direct authority, must deal with state residents, even though the
effect on interstate relationships may be similar in each case.
2. State Payments to Purchase Goods or Services. The expenditure of state money is not limited to subsidy payments, of
course. Much of the state's treasury is spent on the purchase of
goods and services for the operation of government. But is there
anything about state commercial expenditures that should curtail
the power the states normally have to prefer residents in the distribution of state revenues?
2" This argument cannot be carried too far. For example, it would not justify purporting to tax in-state and out-of-state businesses equally and then subsidizing the in-state businesses. As noted above, this practice clearly would amount to discriminatory taxation.
20" In Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), the Court unanimously overturned an amendment to the New York scheme for taxing stock transfers that
discriminated against sales of stock by nonresidents on out-of-state exchanges by reducing
the tax otherwise due New York only when the sale took place on the New York Stock
Exchange. Even though the preference for in-state sales also advantaged nonresident sellers,
Justice White concluded that "a state may [not] tax in a manner that discriminates between
two types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial interests over out-ofstate businesses." Id. at 335. At the same time, however, he insisted, without elaboration,
that the Court's decision
does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth
and development of intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a State
may not compete with other States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State.
Id. at 336-37.
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Once one accepts the basic premise of Silas Mason and the
preferential business subsidy-that state conduct designed to help
resident industry attract business is not invalid per se-it is too
late to criticize state purchasing policies preferring in-state suppliers for seeking an impermissible objective. Moreover, because the
state may not deny the nonresident sdpplier equal opportunity to
offer its goods and services to resident consumers other than the
state itself, it normally cannot be said that the state monopolizes
in-state sales opportunities.
On the other hand, state commercial payments do not pose
the free-rider problem that pure subsidy payments do. Unlike welfare payments or business subsidies, state purchases of equipment
and services will be made whether or not a rule of nonresident
equality is imposed. Indeed, states without purchasing policies
favoring in-state businesses enjoy a greater opportunity to save
state funds through competitive bidding on a broader basis.
Still, it is not a necessary condition of state power to favor
residents that lack of power to discriminate will effectively eliminate state ability to adopt a program at all (although when that
condition is met the state generally will have a stronger case for
favoring residents). Although allowing the states to bias their
purchasing policies in favor of resident suppliers departs from freetrade principles, opportunities to sell to the state exist only because they were created by the state and its residents. Those opportunities can, therefore, justifiably be limited to the state's
residents.
3. State Employment. The Supreme Court has never passed
on the validity of a state policy favoring residents for public employment. °7 The issue tends to be treated more seriously than
state preference for resident suppliers, although the state spends
money to obtain labor, just as it might spend money to buy goods
or the services of independent contractors. Perhaps this is because
it is more common to think of eligibility for state employment as a
question of state distribution of employment opportunities rather
than as a question of state allocation of money. But whatever the
more comfortable characterization is, it remains true that the jobs
are created by the state for the primary purpose of serving resident
interests, using funds collected (largely from residents) for that
purpose. When the state hires workers to carry out state programs

11

See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 n.15 (1978), discussed in note 162 supra.
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and gives resident applicants priority in filling the jobs, it has a
dual objective in mind-to get the work done and to subsidize resident employment. Both objectives are constitutionally valid, and
the means chosen fit within the previously advanced justifications
for state authority to prefer residents.
Professor Simson recently argued that, except "with respect to
high elected office," the privileges and immunities clause should be
imposed as a bar to favoring residents for public employment.208
He rejected the use of residence classifications as a permissible
means of reducing resident unemployment. The reasons he gave
were that a priority for residents does not clearly increase resident
employment, because the resident might otherwise be employed in
the state's private sector anyway, and that the problem of resident
unemployment can be addressed "at least as effectively
by job'20 9
training programs and other less drastic means.
I find neither of these reasons persuasive. Consider, first, a
state that deals with resident unemployment by adopting a policy
of making the state government the employer of last resort. By
definition, only currently unemployed residents will be hired under
the program. There is then no reason to fear that the state is drawing residents from the private sector. The public sector resident
preference program does achieve an increase in total resident employment, and it does so directly.21 0 Nor are suggested alternatives
just as effective. Job-training programs do not increase employment at present, nor do they guarantee that a job will be available
when the training is over. Moreover, are we to assume that participation in the state's job-training program may be restricted to residents? If so, it is difficult to see how the educational advantage can
be any more easily justified than the employment preference. If
not, the suggested alternative is rendered an even weaker substitute for the state's goal of reducing unemployment among
residents.
210 Simson, supra note 126, at 393.
209 Id.
210It

seems clear that a state could not attack unemployment by requiring the private

sector to prefer residents in hiring. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978), Justice
Brennan's opinion for a unanimous Court described the argument "that a State may validly
attempt to alleviate its unemployment problem by requiring private employers within the
State to discriminate against nonresidents" as "an assumption made at least dubious by
Ward [v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871)]." Given the Court's history of protection
of nonresident access to the commercial opportunities available in the private sectors of
other states, see text and notes at notes 14-18 supra, it is very difficult to imagine the Court
upholding such a scheme.
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The state's justification for reserving state jobs for residents
may appear somewhat weaker when the advantage given to residents is not limited to the currently unemployed. But appearances
can mislead. If the state is in fact drawing residents away from the
private sector, that only leaves more opportunities there, where the
resident and nonresident are free to compete for the job vacancies.
If a resident fills the private sector vacancy, the state has achieved
an overall increase in resident employment. If a nonresident fills
the vacancy, the state job preference for residents puts the nonresident in a better position than he would have been in had the state
chosen not to create the state job and never caused the private
sector vacancy. Either the preference is justified or the nonresident
is advantaged, not disadvantaged.
It would be meaningless to talk of a requirement of nonresident access when the state has an abundance of vacancies. Every
state job is a scarce resource if there is competition for it. Even if a
state chooses not to fill a job vacancy for which only nonresidents
apply, its justifiable choice is merely to save its scarce financial resources for other uses. But it might plausibly be argued that some
state jobs cannot be duplicated in the private sector, and as to
these, at least, nonresidents are entitled to equal consideration because of the state monopolization. This argument also fails, however, for the only state jobs that cannot be duplicated in the private sector are those core political positions that are most
appropriately reserved to residents because of the political responsibilities of the officeholders to their resident constituents. 11 In
short, the general principle supporting state authority to prefer
residents in the distribution of state-created resources applies fully
to state employment.
B. State-Created Goods and Services
Questions of the validity of state resident preference policies
arise when a state distributes resources in kind as well as when it
spends money. When the state converts its fiscal resources into
goods or services that it makes available on a residence-discriminatory basis, the same justification that supports state expenditures
favoring residents should apply. The value of state flexibility to
serve state residents in a variety of ways, both tested and experimental, strengthens the claim of a state that wishes to convert
See text and note at note 153 supra.
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state revenues into programs believed to be beneficial to its constituents. Different rules for state-created goods and services and
state payments to residents would unnecessarily narrow the ability
of state government to create new ways of serving its people. Except where special circumstances dictate otherwise, the state
should be able to reserve in-kind resources created with state
funds for its residents. To take just one example, there is no
greater reason to restrict state power to limit eligibility for public
housing to residents than there is to restrict state power to limit
eligibility for welfare payments that can be used to purchase private housing. So long as the state does not monopolize housing
construction, public housing projects may be limited to residents.
The same analysis is applicable to a multitude of state programs,
but two in particular deserve special attention.
1. The Sale of Goods Manufactured by State Enterprise.In
the recent case of Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,2 12 the Supreme Court narrowly upheld over commerce clause objections South Dakota's policy of preferring residents as customers of the state's cement plant.
Justice Blackmun's general defense of the proprietary exemption
from commerce clause scrutiny was criticized earlier.2 13 But later in
his opinion, in the course of examining whether the South Dakota
policy fell within any "exception" to the "general rule of Alexandria Scrap, '21 4 he did touch on some of the themes of this article.
Justice Blackmun briefly stated that invalidation of the preference for resident business "would discourage similar state
projects, even though this project has demonstrably served the
needs of state residents and has helped the entire region for more
than half a century," and would rob the state "of the intended
benefit of its foresight, risk, and industry. 21 5 It is somewhat exaggerated to suggest that unless the state could prefer residents they
would derive little benefit from, and therefore have little incentive
to establish, a source of supply they thought the private sector
could not be relied upon to provide. Because the state was selling
the cement, and because some resident businesses would benefit
from the availability of cement even if some nonresidents also
would benefit, free-rider problems would not have completely eliminated the incentive to develop a state cement plant. But state rep2'2 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
213 See text and notes at notes 79-87 supra.
214
215

447 U.S. at 440.
Id. at 446 (footnote omitted).
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resentatives probably will consider the extent to which state residents will benefit from a proposed investment of state funds, and
the Court therefore should examine the extent of the disincentive
to adopting a state program created by a ban on resident preference, whether or not the state program can fairly be described as
proprietary.
Justice Blackmun also adverted to the broader justification for
resident preference suggested in this article when he rejected the
argument advanced by the out-of-state plaintiff that, despite the
"proprietary" character of the state program, the resident preference policy was an invalid attempt at protectionism.216 The four
dissenters were persuaded of the validity of the resident preference
with respect to sales for public use, but agreed with the plaintiff
that the preference for resident customers in the state's private
sector was forbidden economic protectionism-protection of "private economic interests within the State from the forces of the
interstate market."' 1 7 Justice Blackmun responded by saying that
the State's policy was
"protectionist" only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state treasury
and whom the State was created to serve. [This] argument apparently also would characterize as "protectionist" rules restricting to state residents the enjoyment of state educational
institutions, energy generated by a state-run plant, police and
fire protection, and agricultural improvement and business
development programs. Such policies, while perhaps "protectionist" in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government-to serve the citizens of the State. 1 8
This passage should have been the starting point of the
Court's opinion. 1 9 Justice Blackmun also adverted to the possibil216Id. at 442.
217 Id.
218Id.

at 447 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
at 442 (footnote omitted).
219 With some changes. Justice Blackmun's list of examples perhaps could have been
better chosen or more precisely defined. As this article argues, there may be strong reasons

to insist on a state's obligation to provide nonresidents within the state with police and fire
protection or state-monopolized utility service. Perhaps Justice Blackmun was referring only
to a nonresident's claim that these services be provided beyond the state's borders when he
so easily asserted the state's power to restrict these services to residents. In addition, the
apparent assumption that only residents fund the state treasury is overbroad. See text at
notes 171-172 supra.
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ity that the state's possession of monopoly power might have made
a difference. He distinguished natural resources from cement and
other "end-products of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials,"2 2 0 and he
stressed, consistently with an emphasis on monopoly power, that
South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's
limestone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it
restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up
plants within its borders .... Moreover, petitioner has not
suggested that South Dakota possesses unique access to the
materials needed to produce cement. Whatever limits might
exist on a State's ability to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption to hoard resources which by happenstance are found
there, those limits do not apply here.22 1
In effect, this language amounts to stating that South Dakota
had not raised a barrier to entry by competing firms that might
supply nonresidents. To be sure, South Dakota possessed a kind of
monopoly power simply because it had an available cement supply
in a time of shortage. The majority of the Court appears implicitly
to have rejected that level of monopoly power as sufficient to require nondiscriminatory selling policies and to have left open the
question of whether monopoly power in the sense of unique control
of the supply of a resource should trigger obligations of equality.22 2
One would expect a state to have a greater claim to reserve
state-financed benefits for residents when other organizations are
free to provide similar benefits, even if they have not yet decided
to do so, than when the state's control precludes competition. For
a majority of the Court, it appears that state interests in fiscal autonomy will prevail over a nonresident's claim of access to state
benefits when the state does not have a natural or exclusive mo10

447 U.S. at 444.

11 Id. (footnote omitted).

22 In dissent, Justice Powell rejected the distinction between natural resources and secondary products. Id. at 448 n.2. For one thing, he thought the "Court's definition of cement
production describes all sophisticated economic activity, including the exploitation of natural resources." Id. Perhaps Justice Blackmun's definition was not artfully phrased, but the

distinction certainly is intelligible if he was attempting to distinguish between different degrees of monopoly power. Justice Powell also suggested, however, that he would have imposed an obligation of equality when the state possesses either type of monopoly power. He
emphasized that "in its regional market, South Dakota has unique access to cement." Id.
(emphasis omitted). For him, it was enough that a "cutoff in cement sales has the same
economic impact as a refusal to sell resources like natural gas." Id.
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nopoly. It remains to be seen whether the balance will tip in favor
of nonresident need when state monopoly power is greater.22 3
Quite independently of the proprietary notion, then, the authority of South Dakota to sell its cement only to resident businesses could have been upheld on the principle of resident entitlement to nonmonopolized state-created resources. 22' The only
unfortunate thing about Reeves is that, although the elements of
the principle were adverted to in the Court's opinion, they were
displaced from their rightful place of honor by the ill-conceived
proprietary exception doctrine.
2. State EducationalInstitutions. The same general analysis
is equally applicable to state educational offerings. The state establishes public schools primarily for the purpose of serving residents. At the same time, it cannot constitutionally forbid the operation of private educational institutions within the state, and so
it cannot monopolize education.2 25 The state also may not require
its private institutions to prefer residents, 226 but the Constitution
should not disable the state from restricting attendance at public
institutions to bona fide residents.2 2 7 Whether or not such a re223 It should also be noted that Reeves was a case where the state's resource was not
adequate to satisfy demand; thus sales to nonresidents precluded sales to residents. In short,
it was not an "abundant" resource. See text at notes 177-180 supra. Whether the Court
would reach the same conclusion with respect to an abundant resource is also an open
question.
224 For the same reasons, a state should be able to lease state-owned commercial property to residents first. When state revenues are responsible for the existence of state buildings, and nonresidents are not blocked from operating in alternative locations available in
the private sector, a state is justified in allocating ordinary state property for the preferred
use of residents.
The Fifth Circuit recently held to the contrary in the context of leases of state-owned
sales space to resident farmers selling in competition with out-of-state farmers. Smith v.
Department of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980). The court applied the virtually
per se rule of invalidity applicable to state regulations of private market activity designed to
favor local businesses. Id. at 1084-85. But see note 84 supra.
A more sensitive approach to the case would have focused on the similarity between
state financial subsidies provided only to resident businesses and this nonmonopolistic form
of state in-kind subsidy provided only to resident businesses. The discussion in text at notes
194-206 supra, as well as the discussion here, support a result contrary to that reached in
Smith.
225 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
228 There seems no reason to treat an embargo of private educational offerings differently than embargoes of private goods. See text and note at note 14 supra.
227 This does not mean that a state is free to impose unduly strict requirements as to
who shall be considered a bona fide resident. A state may not, for example, deny a fair
opportunity to a former nonresident to demonstrate that he has become a bona fide resident
eligible for reduced tuition at the state university. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Although the Court has upheld a one-year durational residency requirement as a means of
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striction is desirable as a matter of policy, Justice Blackmun's implicit approval in Reeves of resident preference policies in state
228
schools seems correct.
Little question has been raised about state power to reserve
elementary and secondary public schools for resident use. Professor Simson, however, argues that state power to discriminate
against nonresidents in state-provided higher education extends
only as far as charging nonresidents more than residents, up to the
full cost of the education provided, and does not include the power
to set quotas on nonresident admission. 229 Because the full cost can
be recaptured, he argues that abandonment of nonresident quotas
does not jeopardize the operation of the schools. 230 Secondly,
granting the substantiality of a state interest in providing residents
with the educational benefits of small, high quality institutions, he
claims that the power to charge nonresidents more enables the
state to provide more of these types of schools if nonresident demand is great. He finds that "the state has no material interest in
1
educating its residents in a specific school. 2' 3
There are several problems with this analysis. First, and least
important, recapturing the full cost of educating nonresidents, but
no more, would be an administratively difficult task. Even assuming that the state is given the benefit of the doubt in calculating
the costs, the problems run much deeper. Expanded facilities to
accommodate paying nonresidents may incur noneconomic costs,
and these cannot easily be recouped. Size, location, and accessibility are only a few of the considerations that enter into the planning
of educational institutions. If a state must choose between no public schools or serving all nonresidents who demand admission, are
able to pay, and are otherwise equal to the residents the state
ensuring that only bona fide residents receive the benefit of reduced tuition, Starns v.
Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (mem.), affg 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), it does not
necessarily follow that the Court would uphold such a lengthy period if bona fide residence
were a qualification to attend the state university at all. The greater interest in receiving an
education than in paying reduced tuition might well tip the balance the other way. Moreover, though a state may be entitled to insist that one claiming residency has given up
residence elsewhere, one can reasonably question whether the result in Starns is consistent
with the individual right to choose to relocate from one state to another. In any event, it
seems doubtful that the Court would allow any greater obstacle to becoming a resident.
11' See the language quoted in text at note 218 supra. On this issue, Justice Powell may
agree. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
'

Simson, supra note 126, at 395-97.

Id. at 397.
231 Id.
"s
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wishes to educate, it may hesitate before choosing the second option. A state might not wish to create a vast public educational
establishment despite the ability to charge nonresidents more.
This is especially true when the state must consider the possibility
of future declines in nonresident enrollment. The state could not
force nonresidents to enroll, and if the cost of maintaining a system large enough to meet current demand must be shared among a
significantly smaller number of nonresidents in the future, nonresident tuition might increase to the point where most nonresidents
lose interest, leaving the state with a white elephant. Moreover, it
is difficult to understand why the states have no material interest
in educating residents in particular schools that they create. The
ability to provide particular kinds of educational experiences
would seem to be at the heart of state power to serve state inhabitants. In sum, there is no strong reason to except state colleges and
universities from the general state power to reserve state-created
resources for the preferred, or exclusive, use of residents.
C. State-Owned Natural Resources
In an era increasingly conscious of the scarcity of depletable
natural resources and the fragility of unique scenic resources, it
should be unnecessary to emphasize the importance of the rules of
access that will determine the distribution of such resources. In a
federal system of government, recognition of the power of constituent political units to reserve the natural resources found within
their jurisdiction for the use of their own inhabitants carries a serious potential for division of the nation along provincial lines, as
Canada's recent experience well illustrates.3 2 Although constitutional barriers to state discrimination against out-of-staters are
now well established with respect to natural resources that are either privately owned 33 or possessed by no one,2 34 the power of
states that own natural resources to favor their residents when
those public resources are made available for use remains
unsettled.
'3See

Balkanizing Canada: The Cost of Provincial Barriers, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15,

1980, at 52.
"3
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
'3 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
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The fortuitous geographical distribution of natural resources
has a number of consequences related to state power. On the positive side, the presence of valuable natural resources within a state,
regardless of who owns them, provides a basis for local economic
prosperity, and, in the case of scenic resources, for aesthetic satisfaction and recreation. On the negative side, exploitation of natural resources seems inevitably to cause adverse effects on local residents, whether from pollution, overcrowding, or some other
undesirable byproduct. The states must have power to control
these adverse effects, of course, if they are to care for their residents. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the states must
have the power to grant their residents a favored right to exploit
state-owned natural resources, any more than the power to regulate the exploitation of privately owned natural resources implies
state power to compel private sector favoritism towards residents. 3 5 If state authority to prefer residents is to be upheld in
this context, therefore, some other justification will be required.
The principles developed in this article can best be applied if
the inquiry is divided according to the different kinds of natural
resources a state might own. Although the common characteristic
of natural resources is that they are not the products of human
creation, some are living and reproducible and some are not, and
some, though not reproducible, can be used repeatedly without being depleted. These distinctive attributes of different sorts of natural resources have an important bearing on the validity of resident
preference schemes, and each type of natural resource will therefore be treated separately.
1. Natural Resources That Cannot Be Reproduced. A distinctive feature of some randomly distributed natural resources,
such as mineral deposits, is that they are inanimate and exist without (and indeed cannot be created by) human action, whether by
state political units or any other human agency. Thus the justification for state resident preference when a state creates and provides
collective goods and services is not necessarily available when a
state wishes to distribute nonreproducible natural resources that it
owns. These resources exist without the need for communal
cooperation.
"" Nor does it follow from the right of a state to regulate natural resources located
within its borders for the purpose of conservation that the state may favor residents when
the resource is allowed to be exploited. See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,
.340 U.S 179, 188 (1950).
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For this reason, I cannot agree with Professor Hellerstein's
view that a rule preventing a state "from distributing or selling
state-owned natural resources to in-state residents or businesses on
a preferential basis" would be "disturbing.

' 238

His argument is

worth quoting in full:
To preclude the States from preferring in-state interests in
the distribution of state natural resources would deprive the
States of an important attribute of their separate existence as
independent political units in the federal system. The denial
to the States of the power to provide for their residents as
such would undermine the relationship between the States
and their residents. Moreover, forbidding the States from preferring their own in the distribution of their resources would
introduce into the federal system an unsettling asymmetry between the respective obligations the resident and nonresident
2 37
owe to the State and the benefits they enjoy there.

Professor Hellerstein does focus on factors generally germane to
state authority to prefer residents. But the untoward consequences
of a rigid rule of nondiscriminatory access that are a justifiable
concern when the resources are state-created seem to me not implicated when inanimate natural resources are in question. Neither
the relationship between the states and their residents, nor the
purposes of state political organization, require the ability to reserve state-owned natural resources for the use of residents. State
experimentation and innovation are not curtailed, because the resources exist without state action. Nor does anything about the
difference in the respective relationships between residents and
their state, and nonresidents and the state, have any bearing on
the location or allocation of those resources. Indeed, to the extent
that these natural blessings provide the states in which they are
found with a sounder tax base and greater economic potential, residents already enjoy a relative advantage over nonresidents. A further advantage is not deserved, nor is one necessary to fulfill state
responsibilities, just because the resources happen to be located
within the state.
One might refine the argument somewhat and contend that
the state's power to prefer residents in the distribution of natural
resources it owns should depend on the source of the state's owner-

"3'
237

Hellerstein, supra note 44, at 77.
Id.
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ship. Although resource ownership stemming from original dominion should provide no justification for such a power,"3 8 arguably
the power should be recognized where the state uses state funds to
purchase natural resources. But a second reason for withholding
the power to discriminate on the basis of residence-the equality
obligations of monopoly power-is still significant in this context.
For another distinctive feature of nonreproducible state-owned
natural resources is, by definition, that they cannot be reproduced
by the private sector. As a general matter, then, so long as the
state holds natural resources that cannot be replenished, it must
provide equal access to nonresidents. The state's strongest case for
resident preference would be presented when it purchased the resources in the open market and significant private supplies of the
resource also existed within the state. Perhaps here, as long as the
state did not control an important share of the resource deposits,
authority to favor residents might be justified. Otherwise, a rule of
nondiscriminatory access should be followed.
This analysis should govern the disposition of all
nonreproducible resources owned by the states. It may be most important in the case of state ownership of mineral and energy deposits. These resources are depleted by consumption and the local
claim to preferred distribution is weak and overshadowed by the
importance of nationwide availability of the resource. But the
same basic problem is presented where nonreproducible natural resources are capable of repeated use, whether for commercial or recreational purposes. Recall the problem presented in McCready v.
Virginia,2 " where the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's exclusion
of nonresidents from the planting of oysters in the state's tidelands. The state's ownership of the tidelands should not have justified discrimination, because the tidelands are a unique natural resource, not reproducible by the private sector and not established
by a state program. The absence of state creation and the equality
obligations of monopoly power should have compelled nonresident
access. If the state needed to limit oyster planting to preserve the

2 Alaska, for example, received title to millions of acres of land, with full mineral
rights, by conveyance from the federal government. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528
n.11 (1978). In any case where the state's wealth does not derive from the contributions of
residents acting through the state, there is good reason to adhere strictly to obligations of
interstate equality. That is especially true when the national government conveys property
to a state without compensation.
23, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), discussed in text at notes 26-31 supra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:487

tidelands it could have done so in a nondiscriminatory manner.""
If it spent money to preserve them, it could have charged nonresidents for the costs created by their use. But exclusion was not justified. Because of the state's monopoly power, the Court's analo-gies-equating nonresident exclusion from the tidelands with
nonresident exclusion from a share of the proceeds of the sale of
public property and with nonresident exclusion from planting corn
on state-owned land 2 41-are inapposite. Once the state sells property, the resource it then distributes is money. Arable land is rarely
unique; the private sector generally will control other land suitable
for planting. Recognition of state power to distribute these public
resources to residents does not require the same result when the
issue is distribution of unique natural resources not available in
the private sector.
A similar approach supports the conclusion that nonresidents
and residents must have equal access to state beaches and parks.4 2
Most state beach and park property is unique and not reproducible. It should therefore be subject to the rule of nondiscriminatory
access regardless of the fact that its intended use is recreational.2 4 3
2. Reproducible Natural Resources. The case for equality of
nonresident access to state-owned natural resources is much more
difficult to make when the resources are living and reproducible,
because the state may well have invested public funds in increasing
the originally available resource. Thus the produce of state farms
and ranches is as much a creation of state programs as the cement
produced from raw materials by South Dakota's cement plant, and
the governing principles ought to be the same. As long as the state
does not have monopoly power over the raw materials or plant or
animal life necessary to produce or reproduce the commodities to
be distributed, and as long as it does not forbid competition with
itself within the state, the state ought to be free to parcel out state
fruits, vegetables, timber, chickens, cattle, and the like to residents
240

See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979).

2'1 See 94 U.S. at 395-96.
24I The case for equality may be even stronger here, because these resources are usually

not used to capacity. The state interest in minimizing crowds and other noneconomic costs,
although it exists, is not strong.
243 State-financed golf courses, tennis courts, and so on have to stand on a different
footing. At least where the state can make a case for scarcity, and where no first amendment
rights to a "public forum" are implicated, see generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, resident preference, if not hospitable, is at

least justifiable because of the state creation of the resource.

1981]

State "Citizenship"

alone.
If a state were to own an entire species of plant or animal life,
or enough of the species that private development was infeasible,
one might expect that nonresidents could not be denied equal access to any distribution. One would certainly expect that result if
the wildlife, peculiarly native to the state, was in neither state nor
private possession. If the state does not "own" the wildlife in this
sense, it can hardly claim to have created the resource.2 It will be
recalled, however, that in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,24
Justice Blackmun (who later intimated in Reeves that state monopoly power over natural resources might restrict state power to
favor residents when the nonresident seeks the commodity to earn
a living 24") upheld a state discrimination against nonresidents

wishing to hunt elk that the state did not own. Because the reason
given was that the privileges and immunities clause does not apply
to claims of nonresident access for "nonfundamental" recreational
purposes, 4 we should not conclude that the Court would treat the
commercial distribution of state-monopolized wildlife the same
way. We know from Hughes v. Oklahoma24" that if the state does

not own wildlife and the nonresident's purpose is commercial, then
discrimination against interstate commerce is impermissible. What
we do not know is whether, if elk were sought as a means of livelihood and Montana monopolized ownership of the elk supply, the
Court would be inclined to follow the intimations of Reeves or
would distinguish unique access to inanimate, depletable resources
from unique control of reproducible resources.
In a valiant effort to explain the result reached in Baldwin
without resting on what he also believes is the empty distinction
between fundamental and nonfundamental activities, Professor
Tribe suggests that perhaps the Court thought the "elk should be
treated constitutionally as if they were the property of the state,"
because the state's effort to preserve them was equivalent to resource creation. 4 9 Moreover, he thinks it "must be clear ...

that

144 This question may at first glance, however, appear to be complicated by conservation programs, habitat creation, the stocking of rivers and lakes, and the like. See text at

notes 249-250 infra.
245436

U.S. 371 (1978), discussed in text and notes at notes 88-118 supra.
See text and notes at notes 220-231 supra.
2,7436 U.S. at 388. See the criticism of this analysis in text and notes at notes 97-118
124

supra.
441 U.S. 322 (1979), discussed in text at notes 53-55, 63 supra.
24 L. TRBE, supra note 46, at 38 (Supp. 1979).
248
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the Court is willing to tolerate significant discrimination against
nonresidents because it cannot be sure, if a state like Montana is
forced to act evenhandedly, that its citizens will not simply give up
entirely the effort to conserve their wildlife. '250 To take the latter
point first, it is none too clear why the Court would not fashion a
rule at least forbidding discrimination that cannot be cost justified.
So long as the state can recoup the cost of conservation, the incentives to conserve would have the same weight as if nonresidents
could be denied access. Besides, if this were the Court's conception, it would be equally applicable to commercial distribution.
True, it is arguable that state incentives to conserve, despite requirements of nonresident equality, would be greater where residents stand to gain commercially from continued supply than
where residents stand to gain only recreational opportunities. But
the notion that expenditures to preserve wildlife are the equivalent
of state creation is equally applicable to wildlife used for commercial and recreational purposes. To uphold state power to prefer
residents because of the "creative" aspects of such expenditures
would therefore suggest a similar rule when state-monopolized reproducible resources are commercially distributed. It would be better to assume that the Court really intended to rest the case on the
fundamental/nonfundamental distinction than to supply a more
substantive explanation of the case that risks undesirable results in
other contexts. It would be better still, of course, if the emptiness
of the articulated distinction in Baldwin were recognized. Perhaps,
if left unsupported, it will in time fall of its own weight. At that
point, discrimination on the basis of residence should be forbidden
with respect to commercial, or recreational access to state-monopolized wildlife. In the meantime, interstate equality should be required at least with respect to commercial access, and state expenditures for conservation should not be viewed as a justification
for resident preference when the species conserved are available
only from the state.
IV.

CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES

State subsidy of resident interests through direct distribution
of public resources obviously can take many forms and raise a variety of issues. Still another set of questions arises, however, if a
state limits eligibility to receive public resources to those (res-

20

Id. at 40.
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idents or nonresidents) who will themselves prefer residents in separate private dealings. The additional difficulty is because the state
is constitutionally powerless to compel private parties to deal with
residents. 51 Using the lure of state resource availability to affect
private relationships falls somewhere between forbidden compulsion and the permissible state power to allocate state resources directly to residents. Just as congressional exercises of the spending
power that condition eligibility for grants on agreement to do what
Congress lacks the power to command directly give rise to constitutional qualms, 2 52 so, too, one should be suspicious of state in-

ducement of private conduct that the state is forbidden to require
through conditional entitlement to partake of state resources.
Again, there is a need to distinguish among the kinds of public
resources that a state proposes to use as an inducement. Whenever
the resource is such that the state cannot constitutionally prefer
residents even in direct unconditional distribution, a fortiori it
should not have the power to influence private parties to favor residents through conditional distribution. For example, if the Court
were to agree with the conclusion that Alaska is not free to favor
its residents in the allocation of state-owned oil and gas reserves, it
would surely follow that Alaska could not condition the grant of
rights to exploit the oil and gas on the licensee's willingness to hire
residents first, or to favor residents as suppliers or customers.
Even if the Court allows state allocation of a public resource
to residents first, it still might be concerned about the leverage a
state can exert on private relationships through conditional distribution. There is some evidence that the Court does react this way,
although the Justices have not expressly spoken in this vein, and
the Court's experience with the problem is too limited to give rise
to a comprehensive theory. In Hicklin v. Orbeck,5 s it will be recal'51 See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923).
151 Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, which authorized a tax on agricultural processors and use of the
monies collected to pay farmers to reduce crop production, as a coercive purchase of compliance with regulations Congress could not impose) with Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 585 (1937) (upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act, which gave a federal tax credit to employers required to contribute to Social Security for contributions made to a state unemployment fund meeting federal standards, finding
no "coercion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal form of government"). See also Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in
the Welfare State, 39 WAsH. L. Rav. 4, 28-31 (1964).
155 437 U.S. 518 (1978), discussed in text at notes 39-45 supra.
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led, a unanimous Court disapproved Alaska's attempt to use its
ownership of oil and gas to require all who contracted with the
state, and all who contracted with the state's contractors, to give
employment preferences to Alaska residents. The Court found the
breadth of the attempted control too great to be justified by the
state's "proprietary interest. 2 54 The apparent concern was that
Alaska had attempted to pyramid its ownership of oil and gas into
control of the private sector on such a wide basis that the program
of conditional distribution was barely distinguishable from regulation. But the resemblance to regulation would be equally apparent
if Alaska had only required direct contractors to favor resident interests, for the virtually coercive power that accompanies control
of such scarce and valuable resources would be fully as effective as
regulation in causing immediate contractors to bias their business
decisions. It was really the conditions placed on eligibility to exploit the state resources, together with the state's bargaining
power, that raised the problem-not the breadth of the program.
At the other end of the spectrum, where conditional distribution might be thought to resemble impermissible regulation least,
is the conditional distribution of state funds. This was involved in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,2 55 although the Court did not
analyze the case this way. The offer of a bonus to those who deal
with residents is obviously a conditional distribution. In dissent,
Justice Brennan distinguished state purchases for state consumption from purchases in the midst of the stream of commerce.2 5 Another way of thinking about the same problem is to distinguish between state expenditures for supply to the state and state
expenditures to cause one private party to deal with another who
is a resident; that is, the difference between conditional and unconditional dispositions of state funds.
If the use of state monies to influence private contracting
choices is permissible where direct regulation would not be, perhaps it is because in cases like Alexandria Scrap the bonus payment for deliveries to in-state processors seems so much like an
unconditional financial subsidy to the processors. Presumably they
2N

Id. at 529.

25 426 U.S. 794 (1976), discussed in text at notes 68-70 supra.
2" Id. at 824. He did so, however, only to suggest that the issue in Alexandria Scrap
was even more difficult than the issue of the validity of state purchases for end use. Apparently, Justice Brennan (along with Justices White and Marshall, who joined his opinion)
would not allow resident preference in either type of purchase where "economic protectionism" motivated the preference policy. Id. at 823.
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would -use such a subsidy to enhance the price they offered for
abandoned cars and thereby attract business that might otherwise
go to out-of-state processors. The validity of the analogy depends
on the belief that a direct subsidy would be used to further the
activity to which the conditional subsidy is tied. If a perception of
this kind swayed the Court in Alexandria Scrap, the case would be
narrow and would not even control all cases of conditional financial
subsidies. For example, if a state sought to alleviate resident unemployment by paying a bonus to private employers to hire residents over nonresidents, one could not say that an unconditional
subsidy to the private employers probably would achieve the same
result; the employers might lower prices instead. Hence, the resemblance of this subsidy program to a regulatory program would be
more apparent.
It is entirely possible-and perhaps more consistent with the
language of the opinion- - 5 that the Court's view was broader,
and that the majority was moved by the perception that a state
ought to be able to buy a service from the private sector that it is
free to provide itself. From this perspective, assuming that a state
can subsidize resident business directly or provide state jobs for
residents, it should also have the choice to accomplish its goals by
purchasing private sector services. If this is the Court's view, however, it should be recognized how close to the pattern of control by
regulation the conditional subsidy is.
Justice Powell's opinion in Alexandria Scrap does emphasize
that the state merely intervened in the market by financial competition,2 5 8 thereby supporting this broader interpretation. Still unresolved is the question of state power to condition entitlement to
public goods and services on the recipient's preference of residents.
Justice Powell dissented in Reeves, where only the unconditional
distribution of state goods in short supply was at issue. Ironically,
though two members of the majority in Alexandria Scrap voted
against the resident preference policy in Reeves, Justice Marshall,
one of the dissenters in the former, supplied the fifth vote to up'7 See text at notes 69-70 supra.

I"S Thus he wrote that "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to
regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market
itself to bid up their price." 426 U.S. at 806. He went on to say that the state "elected the
payment of state funds-in the form of bounties-to encourage the removal of automobile
hulks from Maryland streets and junkyards." Id. at 809. Finally, he emphasized that the
hulks "remain within Maryland in response to market forces, including that exerted by
money from the State." Id. at 810.
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hold state power to prefer residents in the latter. Unfortunately, as
the only Justice to vote against state power in Alexandria Scrap
and for it in Reeves, Justice Marshall did not write an opinion in
either case. But his position in both cases is consistent-and, I
think, correct-insofar as it represents a view that a state may distribute nonmonopolized, state-provided resources to residents first,
but may not use the leverage of access to those resources in order
to bias private relationships toward parochial interests. If South
Dakota had declared that it would only sell cement to customers
who would favor residents when they bought, sold, or hired, I suspect Justice Marshall would have made a majority to strike down
the state policy.
In sum, when a state attempts to use public resource distribution to control relationships within the private sector, its power
should be more limited than when it uses unconditional public resource distribution to aid residents. The Court's decisions are not
necessarily to the contrary. Furthermore, the more leverage is provided by the particular resource the state plans to use as a carrot,
the more the carrot resembles a stick. The leverage obtained by
attaching strings to financial subsidies; if itself justified, should be
the outer limit of state power to exert influence over private relationships. When the state gets its leverage from having the only
available cement or other lures of state business, it should be precluded from using its greater bargaining power to accomplish indirectly-and too effectively-what it is forbidden to compel
directly.
V. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO AFFECT STATE RESmENT
PREFERENCE PROGRAMS

The Supreme Court always has taken, and undoubtedly will
continue to take, a leading role in accommodating state and interstate interests when issues of discrimination against nonresidents
or nonresident business are raised.2 5 9 But Congress, too, may
choose to play a part, and if it does, the focus shifts from the constitutionality of state power to the constitutionality of federal
power. Two polar types of congressional action are likely to be
questioned: prohibiting states from favoring residents in circum269 The foundations of judicial enforcement of the commerce clause are explained in
note 4 supra. The Court's enforcement of the privileges and immunities clause flows even
more directly from the constitutional text than does its enforcement of the negative implications of the commerce clause.
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stances where the Court would otherwise find the state authority
constitutional, and consenting to state resident preference where
the Court would find state authority lacking had Congress not
spoken.
A. Congressional Prohibition of State Resident Preference
Whenever state power to favor resident interests is constitutionally justified because the state is fulfilling the special obligations it owes its own citizens, congressional attempts to limit the
favoritism will run into the claim of unconstitutional interference
with state autonomy.260 For those who believe that state autonomy
interests are sufficiently protected by the national political process,2 61 no judicial determination of congressional power would be
necessary, although the constitutional question might be important
in the congressional debate itself.26 But in any event, a majority of
the present Court is prepared to extend judicial protection to perceived constitutional state autonomy interests.
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery 65 is the necessary starting
point. It is the only decision in over forty years to strike down an
act of Congress for violating state autonomy. In that case, the
Court held Congress powerless to mandate state wage and hour
policy with respect to state employees engaged in the performance
of "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."264 The Court did not question federal power to set wage
and hour requirements to be followed by either private employers2 65 or state employers with respect to employees engaged in
t60 For a good discussion of state autonomy interests in the face of congressional regulation, see Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-

plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-11, 1231-68
(1977).

261See generally National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1976) (Brennan, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Feder-

alism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).

'" See generally Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator'sGuide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
$43 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"Id.
at 852.
'6 That power was upheld in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the continuing vitality of which the Court did not question. In National League of Cities itself the
Court rejected the argument that federal preemption of state regulation of the private sector
was as much an impairment of state sovereignty as federal regulation of the state as employer. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
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266
state commercial activity.

Applying NationalLeague of Cities' dichotomy of state functions to issues of resident preference, there should be little doubt
about congressional power to ban state discrimination in the context of state business or state aid to private business. If Congress
can mandate state compliance with federal safety regulations on
state-owned railroads 26 7 and with federal wage and hour requirements for employees engaged in state business, it should also have
the power to forbid discrimination against nonresidents who want
to buy from, sell to, or work for state businesses, and to forbid
state subsidies limited to resident businesses. Surely if Congress
concludes that these discriminations adversely affect national productivity, the commerce power supplies ample authority to deal
with the problem.
But suppose Congress outlaws exclusion of nonresidents from
state welfare programs, public schools, public housing, or state jobs
in "areas of traditional governmental functions"? Here the state
autonomy concerns underlying National League of Cities are more
troublesome. Inclusion of nonresidents in each of these programs
would require a state to spend much more in order to serve its
residents fully. In the case of welfare and perhaps public housing,
the state might well choose to reduce or eliminate its programs
rather than extend eligibility to nonresidents. Requiring equal consideration for "integral" state jobs might present less of a problem,
at least where the state is not acting as employer of last resort,
because such jobs presumably will be provided in any case. But
here, the argument of freedom to "structure" relationships with
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the
Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar
exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as
States.
426 U.S. at 845. Later in his opinion, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual
or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce." Id.
at 854.
'" In addition to restricting its holding to "integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," id. at 852, the Court expressly disclaimed any intention to overturn the holdings of United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which sustained congressional authority to require a state-owned, nonprofit railroad available for public hire to
comply with federal safety requirements, or California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), which
upheld application of the federal Railway Labor Act to employment relationships between a

state-owned railroad and its employees. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.

1

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
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residents in the provision of traditional state services can be
made.26
On the other hand, congressional power to regulate commerce
is supplemented by congressional power to enforce the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,6 9 which extends its
protective mantle to classifications based on state of residence.27 0
Under the rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan,27 1 which recognizes

congressional power to prohibit state discrimination permitted by
judicial interpretations of the Constitution, Congress should have
powers beyond those granted by the commerce clause to prohibit
state resident preferences. Moreover, a few older Supreme Court
cases arguably imply, albeit weakly, direct congressional power to
enforce the interstate privileges and immunities clause. 72 These

precedents fall far short of asserting an article IV, section 2 enforcement power comparable to that recognized in Morgan under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, but it is hardly a radical
proposition to assume that Congress should have the power to act
in the interest of interstate unification.
These combined congressional powers may well be adequate to
uphold virtually any ban on state resident preferences despite the
implications of National League of Cities. I do not undertake a
more comprehensive examination of this problem here, because
this type of congressional action is not likely to be common given
14'

In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980), part of Justice Blackmun's re-

sponse to the claim that the state's preference for resident customers violated the commerce
clause was the observation that "[s]uch a holding... would interfere significantly with a
State's ability to structure relations exclusively with its own citizens."
249 See generally L. TRmE, supra note 46, § 5-14. In National League of Cities, the
Court was careful to "express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect [even] integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
170 See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388-91 (1978).
271384 U.S. 641 (1966).
171 In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), the Court struck down a federal
criminal statute prohibiting private conspiracies to deprive any person of "equal protection
of the laws or equal privileges or immunities under the laws." The Court found no constitutional basis for Congress to outlaw individual, as opposed to state, interference with these
rights. The Court considered article IV, section 2 as a possible basis of congressional authority, but determined that it, "like the Fourteenth Amendment, is directed against State action." Id. at 643. The implication is that there would be congressional power to prevent
state interference with rights protected by the privileges and immunities clause. The holding, as well as the implication, of Harris was reaffirmed in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678,
689-90 (1887), and United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920).
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the operation of the "political safeguards of federalism. 2 73 Also,
the potential variations in the circumstances where Congress might
so act would require such a lengthy analysis as to preclude a hypothetical approach. But it is important to be aware that the state
autonomy interests that justify state power to discriminate in favor
of residents may come into conflict with congressional interests in
fostering interstate cohesion. Recognizing the superiority of federal
power in some contexts would mean substantial, or even total, restriction of state ability to provide preferences to its residents as a

class.
B.

Congressional Consent to State Resident Preference

Equally difficult issues are raised by congressional authorization of otherwise unconstitutional state resident preferences. Prevailing commerce clause doctrine already recognizes congressional
power to bless state discriminations against interstate commerce
that the Supreme Court would find-or already has found- incompatible with the unexercised commerce clause. 7 4 The Court
2 75
has had some difficulty explaining the existence of this power,
273 See generally authorities cited note 261 supra.
274

The leading case is Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), which up-

held a'South Carolina tax on insurance premiums received from in-state business that was
imposed only on out-of-state insurance companies. Although the tax clearly discriminated
against interstate commerce, the Court construed the McCarran-Ferguson Act as authorizing it, id. at 427-33, and upheld the power of Congress to authorize a state's discriminatory
tax, id. at 418-27.
- " See id. at 425-26, where Justice Rutledge wrote that in cases where the Court had
held state conduct violative of the commerce clause before Congress had acted on the subject and then upheld the same state conduct after Congress had acted affirmatively to approve it, the
sustaining of Congress' overriding action has involved something beyond correction of
erroneous factual judgment in deference to Congress' presumably better-informed view
of the facts, and also beyond giving due deference to its conception of the scope of its
powers, when it repudiates, just as when its silence is thought to support, the inference
that it has forbidden state action.
Professor Dowling said of this passage:
At this point it seemed almost as if Mr. Justice Rutledge were leading to a mountain top from which he would point out the 'something beyond' which really went to
the root of the matter. But after looking at this point and that on the broad landscape
of his opinion, I was still not sure that my vision had caught the something beyond.
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. Rlv. 547,
557 (1947).
A century earlier, the Court had taken the apparently contrary position that insofar as
the states "were divested of the power to legislate ... by the grant of the commercial power
to Congress," Congress could not "regrant, or in any manner reconvey to the States that
power." Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317 (1851).
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but no doubt that the constitutional limitation is itself implied
from an affirmative grant to Congress, together with Chief Justice
Marshall's still-accepted definition of the commerce power as the
power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed, 1 7 account for the Court's reluctance to overturn congressional determinations that some state discriminations be
permitted.
Even granting the legitimacy of some congressional power to
authorize state discrimination against interstate commerce, however, what if Congress were to authorize state discriminations that
would otherwise violate article IV, section 2? Could Congress, after
Hicklin v. Orbeck,2 " empower Alaska to reinstitute a residentpreference-in-employment law? Or could it authorize state taxes
on the in-state wages of nonresident commuters at the same time
27 1
no tax is applied to the wages of residents?
One of the difficulties in granting Congress such power is that
the direct limitation on state power contained in article IV, section
2, unlike that in the commerce clause, is not textually linked with
any affirmative grant of power to Congress. Moreover, even if the
Court were disposed to recognize implicit congressional power to
enforce the interstate antidiscrimination principle of that section,2 7 and even if the Court would uphold congressional enforcement power when the Court would not independently find state
discrimination unconstitutional, it does not follow that congressional power to dilute the antidiscrimination provision would also
be implied. On the contrary, Katzenbach v. Morgan, s° although it
held that the fourteenth amendment's express grant of congressional enforcement power allowed congressional imposition of
greater restraints on state discrimination than would be imposed
by judicial interpretations of the amendment, also expressly denied
any congressional power "to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the
amendment's equality guarantees.28 1 Certainly one can mount a
strong argument that the interstate equality guarantee of article
IV, section 2 likewise is immune from congressional abrogation.
This is the assumption of Professor Tribe, who asserts that

'76Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).

27 437 U.S. 518 (1978), discussed in text at notes 39-43 supra.
278The

Court held such a tax scheme to be inconsistent with the privileges and immu-

nities clause in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
'79See note 272 supra.
280 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
281Id. at 651 n.10.
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recognition of congressional power to consent to discrimination
against interstate commerce
cannot properly be extended to a conclusion that Congress
has limitless power to authorize state discrimination against
out-of-state citizens. The privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, § 2, for example, confers a personal right against
state action unjustifiably discriminating against out-of-state
citizens whether or not such discrimination is congressionally
authorized. 8 2
May we assume, however, that article IV, section 2 confers a
personal right? Its location in the states' relations article8 3 does
not reinforce the comfortable, traditional assumption that guarantees of equality are protective of individual and group liberty. Furthermore, it is necessary to account for the common origin in the
Articles of Confederation of the antidiscrimination principles of
both the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause.28 4 If the equality guarantee of article IV, section 2 confers a
personal right, why is the equality guarantee of the commerce
clause less effective? Conversely, if Congress has the power to authorize state discrimination against interstate commerce despite
the resulting impairment of interstate unification, why should Congress lack the power to authorize state discrimination against nonresidents on the theory that this, too, better suits the needs of
"Our Federalism"? 28 5 Nothing in the history of the framing or
adoption of the Constitution suggests that these two clauses were
deliberately separated to allow Congress to authorize discrimination in one context but not in the other, 2 6 and the possibility of
viewing article IV, section 2 as a federalism provision subject to
revision by Congress cannot be discounted.
My own view, given the constitutional goal of national cohesion and the difficulties of articulating the constitutional basis of
L. TRmB, supra note 46, § 6-31, at 403 n.18 (emphasis in original).
Article IV of the Constitution generally is addressed to problems of interstate reIationships, such as the effect of one state's legal proceedings in another state, § 1, return of
fugitives, § 2, cl. 2, and the admission of new states by Congress, § 3, cl. 1.
2M See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). See also text at
notes 1-6 supra.
2'8 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
288 It is not clear why the separation was made, but in Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978), Justice Blackmun wrote: "Their separation may have
been an assurance against an anticipated narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. See
Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430-32 (1871)."
282

282
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congressional power to sanction state discriminations against interstate commerce, is that the asymmetry should be eliminated by
negating congressional power to authorize discrimination in either
context. But if the Court decided to accept an asymmetrical view
of congressional power, it should at least be aware of the importance of resting a given decision on the commerce clause rather
than the privileges and immunities clause, or vice-versa, in the
many cases where both are available grounds of decision.8 7 For in
a case like Toomer v. Witsel,5s where the Court split on whether
to hold a state law invalid under article IV, section 2 or under the
commerce clause, the power of Congress to modify the results of
the decision and authorize the state discrimination at issue would
be determined by which constitutional basis the Court chooses.
This effect of an asymmetrical congressional power is another argument for making congressional power in each context congruent.
Again, it would be preferable to adopt a uniform rule that bars
authorization of discrimination than a uniform rule that approves
the power to sanction discrimination.
CONCLUSION

Issues of discrimination and issues of federalism are frequently linked in constitutional discourse. Nowhere is this more
true than when the constitutional legitimacy of state power to discriminate in favor of state residents is questioned. State freedom
to satisfy the needs of state inhabitants often conflicts with nonresident claims to equal shares of the opportunities available
throughout the union. I have argued that a focus on distinctions in
the obligations respectively owed to state government by residents
and nonresidents, and on distinctions based on the reciprocal obligations the state owes to these two classes-that is, a theory of
state "citizenship" in the broadest sense-is the appropriate starting point for assessing the validity of any state discrimination on
the basis of residence. Without necessarily, insisting that state residents possess constitutionally enforceable rights to state-provided
benefits, 289 a theory of state citizenship should recognize that if
2817In

most cases where nonresidents seek to deal with residents within the state, or to
export items out of state, it will be possible to invoke either clause. See generally text at
notes 46-55 supra.
28 334 U.S. 385 (1948), discussed in text and notes at notes 32-38, 51-52 supra.
288 But see Michelnan, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutationsof 'Sovereignty'
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, UnravelingNational
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state representatives do choose to provide for the public welfare
through affirmative government-created programs, the primary
"public" for which they act is the state's citizenry. At the same
time, the state political 'communities must function within the
wider national political community and may not favor their own in
ways that will shut out nonresidents from in-state benefits only the
state can provide.
The legal and philosophical problems of communities within
communities are varied and perplexing. Even in this discrete corner of that vast labyrinth, the challenge of letting the smaller community carry out its functions without becoming isolated from, or
unduly excluding the members of, the broader community, appears
in many forms. It is necessary to deal separately with the peculiarities of each form in order to negotiate the maze successfully. Perhaps the guideposts offered here hold some promise of assistance.

League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977).

